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I. INTRODUCTION  
Special Operations Forces are a critical component of United States Northern 
Command’s mission.  However, unless significant changes are made to the manner in 
which US Northern Command is structured, the capabilities of Special Operations Forces 
may not be used to their full potential when they are most needed.  This paper argues that 
US Northern Command should reorganize to provide better control of Special Operations 
missions in the US Northern Command Area of Responsibility. 
US Northern Command was established as a Geographic Combatant Commander 
in October 2002 with the dual mission of defending the United States from aggression 
and providing support to civil authorities in times of crisis and disaster.  In order to 
defend the Homeland in the most effective manner, the primary focus is on defeating 
attacks of aggression prior to terrorist attacks being realized in the United States.  The 
only means of successfully defeating these attacks prior to their import into the homeland 
is to win the “away game.”  The most adept force to conduct counter-terrorism operations 
of this nature are United States Special Operations Forces (SOF).  Command and control 
of SOF requires an in-depth knowledge of the capabilities and weaknesses of these forces 
which can only be affected by a structure of command with this knowledge, a Special 
Operations-capable command.  US Northern Command, in its current configuration, 
lacks a Special Operations Command capability.  In order for US Northern Command to 
have the highest probability of success in the execution of Special Operations, it is 
imperative that a Special Operations capable command be established to provide the 
Commander, US Northern Command the option to control Special Operations in the US 
Northern Command area of responsibility (AOR). 
This paper will explore the most probable courses of action available for the 
Commander, US Northern Command to command and control Special Operations in the 
US Northern Command AOR. 
Currently (2005), US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) does not have a 
command element with the organic capability to command and control SOF assigned or 
apportioned to the command.  USNORTHCOM has commanders and staffs capable of 
1 
executing command and control in a conventional operation, but the capability to 
command and control Special Operations (SO) does not currently exist in the 
USNORTHCOM span of control.  In order for USNORTHCOM to realize this capability, 
changes in the training and organization of the current USNORTHCOM battle staff 
configuration must be made.  The most efficient and effective means of command and 
control of a SO mission is through the establishment of a Joint Special Operations Task 
Force (JSOTF) to control the operation and report directly to Commander, 
USNORTHCOM.1  To establish this JSOTF in a timely manner and for the commander 
of the JSOTF to understand the requirements and uniqueness of USNORTHCOM, 
USNORTHCOM requires an organic Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC).  To 
create an environment where the probability of success is highest for the execution of the 
mission Joint Publication 3-05 states that Special Operations Forces should command and 
control SO.  A clear and concise chain of command and control of SOF in the execution 
of SO is critical.  The established command and control must be responsive and 
conducted by a Special Operations command and control element.2 
A. HOMELAND DEFENSE VIGNETTE 
In order to illustrate the significance of the requirement for USNORTHCOM to 
develop and maintain a capability to command and control Special Operations, the 
following vignette is provided: 
Department of Homeland Security has elevated the threat level to 
“Orange,” due to intelligence received that Al Qaeda has planned an attack 
against the West Coast of the United States.  Additional information is 
leading to indications that the attack may be conducted using a nuclear 
device. 
An emergency distress signal has just been received from the captain of a 
Princess Lines Cruise Ship which is due to dock in Los Angles the day 
after tomorrow.  The message claims that the ship is being taken over by 
terrorist and passengers are being systematically killed.  Further attempts 
by the US Coast Guard to hail the ship have resulted in no response. 
                                                 
1 JSOTF is a joint task force which is composed of special operations forces from more than one 
service.  This task force is formed to carry out a specific special operation or in support of a larger 
campaign. Joint Pub 1-02, 12 April 2003, p. 288. 
2 US Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, 17 
December 2003. 
2 
The President of the United States declares this to be a matter of 
Homeland Defense which designates the Department of Defense as the 
lead federal agency to confront the crisis.  The Secretary of Defense 
directs that US Northern Command be the supported command for 
executing the mission to deal with the situation. 
US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) designates the Joint Forces 
Maritime Component Command (JFMCC) as the supported commander to 
conduct operations.  The Commander, JFMCC assesses the situation and 
submits his estimate of the situation to USNORTHCOM.  The 
Commander, JFMCC identifies that his forces do not possess the 
capability to handle a hostage situation (nor do his forces possess the 
capability to address a possible nuclear device) like the one that has 
developed off the coast of Los Angles.  He requests the capability to 
conduct a hostage rescue of the passengers and crew aboard the cruise 
ship.  Commander, USNORTHCOM approves the request and submits it 
to the Joint Staff for approval and tasking to US Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM).  The request is approved by The Joint Staff and 
USSOCOM issues orders to the Naval Special Warfare Group to deploy 
forces to the area in support of USNORTHCOM. 
USNORTHCOM continues to monitor the situation and provide 
information and intelligence to the forces that are enroute to the crisis site.  
The USNORTHCOM Commander must designate a command element for 
this Special Operations Force (SOF). 
What organization in the USNORTHCOM has the understanding and 
capability to command a Special Operation of this nature? 
B. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM 
What is the most effective means for USNORTHCOM to execute the command 
and control of SO in the USNORTHCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR)?  Currently, 
USNORTHCOM does not have an organic or apportioned3 command capability to fulfill 
this requirement.  Three options exist for Commander USNORTHCOM: 1) crisis Special 
Operations in the USNORTHCOM AOR will be commanded by the Secretary of Defense 
and non-crisis SO will be commanded by USNORTHCOM Adaptive Joint Force 
Headquarters (AJFHQ); 2) establish a Theater Special Operations Command as a sub-
unified command organic to USNORTHCOM; or 3) USSOCOM will provide a JTF to 
execute missions both crisis and non-crisis SO to support Commander, USNORTHCOM.   
                                                 
3 US Department of Defense Joint Publication 1-02 describes apportionment as being allocated for 
planning for an operation or contingency. 
3 
Analysis of these three options, or courses of action, will help to provide the Commander, 
USNORTHCOM with the best possible solution to the prosecution of SO within the 
USNORTHCOM AOR. 
The most effective and efficient means for USNORTHCOM to command and 
control SO being executed in the USNORTHCOM AOR is through an organic TSOC.  
This TSOC can act as the base element of a JSOTF established to command and control 
an operation or as the Joint Force Special Operations Component Command (JFSOCC).  
TSOCs are established to integrate SOF into the Commander’s plans and contingency 
operations.  The TSOC Commander is responsible for development of plans and conduct 
of joint SO in the Geographic Combatant Command’s (GCC) AOR.  A TSOC also 
provides the GCC the core element for the establishment of a JSOTF organized to direct 
SO missions.4 
An organization that is habitually associated with the day-to-day operation of 
USNORTHCOM, such as a TSOC, has a higher understanding of the intricacies of the 
situation and requires less of a build-up preparation prior to execution of SO missions in 
the USNORTHCOM AOR.  The time required to “ramp up” an organization external to 
the daily life of USNORTHCOM can be critical.  Time is one of the most valuable assets 
and should be managed and coveted during a crisis situation.  If the JSOTF is formed and 
deployed from another organization, such as USSOCOM, this does not afford the 
Commander, USNORTHCOM the most efficient means of executing the mission. 
The creation of a JSOTF deployed from USSOCOM in support of a 
USNORTHCOM SO would provide the Commander, USNORTHCOM with the SO 
expertise required to execute a SO mission.  However, this force is not apportioned to 
USNORTHCOM.  The time required to develop situational awareness of the common 
operating picture of USNORTHCOM and the AOR can become a severe drain on the 
availability of the time to execute the operation. 
If the previous two options do not exist or are not implemented, USNORTHCOM 
will command and control SO missions in the AOR through the AJFHQ.  This 
                                                 
4 US Department of Defense. USSOCOM, Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs), available 
at USSOCOM classified website, http://intel.socom.smil.mil/sojic/mcs/theater_socs/theater_socs.htm, 
accessed March 2004. 
4 
organization consists of representatives from each of the USNORTHCOM directorates, 
operations, intelligence, logistics, etc., in each of its groups.  There are currently six 
components of the Battle Staff which are established at the direction of the Commander.  
They are the Commander’s Executive Board (CEB), Domestic Warning Center (DWC), 
Current Operations Group (COG), Operations Planning Group (OPG), Joint Planning 
Group (JPG) and Combined Intelligence Fusion Group (CIFG).5  A further explanation 
and description of these Groups will be discussed later in the paper. 
Returning to the vignette, Special Operations Forces are the only element in the 
US arsenal of capabilities that possess the training and experience to execute a hostage 
rescue at sea.  They are also the only element that has the capability to handle an 
improvised nuclear device.  Addressing one more complication to the scenario discussed 
above, US SOF are the only element that can conduct this operation at sea while the ship 
is underway and the enemy forces on the ship are likely to attempt to repel the attacking 
rescuers.  Several elements within the US vast array of capabilities maintain and train to a 
capability to handle hostage situations to include many local police forces.  These 
elements, while extremely capable for what they are trained and equipped to execute, 
cannot execute and handle a mission of this complexity and magnitude.  The US Coast 
Guard (USCG) possesses the capability to board a ship and search it.  USCG boarding 
teams can also handle an unruly ship’s crew but, they are not trained and equipped to 
handle a ship’s crew who will fight back and do all they can to prevent the boarding of 
the would-be rescuers. 
Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, describes Special 
Operations as, “special operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive 
areas to achieve military, diplomatic, informational and/or economic objectives 
employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force 
requirement.”  The difference between SO and conventional operations is measured by 
the degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques required, how they are 
employed, the independence from friendly support, operational intelligence, or 
                                                 
5 US Department of Defense. LTC Ross Brown, USNORTHCOM J33. “USNORTHCOM Battle Staff 
and Crisis Action Process,” briefing, Mar 2004. 
5 
indigenous assistance contained within the operation.6  A rescue mission of this 
magnitude can only be categorized as an SO and only executed by SO-capable forces, 
SOF. 
US SOF are specially trained and equipped to handle just such a mission.  Not 
only are they the best trained and equipped force in the world to execute a hostage rescue, 
they are the only force in the US arsenal which can execute the mission with the highest 
probability of success, especially at sea.  SOF are a unique force in the total US arsenal, 
not just the military.  Roger Pezzelle describes the Special Operator as unique and states 
that not every good infantryman can become a good Special Operator.  The psychological 
aspect of Special Operators is what makes SOF different.  Existing and operating for 
extended periods of time in a denied area with indigenous forces and little or no support 
from the US military requires a unique psychological makeup.  Missions that are on the 
edge of human endurance and capability are the norm for Special Operators.7 
The importance of the establishment of a separate Special Operations capable 
command is emphasized by Edward Luttwak, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, Georgetown University, in his discussions of former Chief, Special 
Operations Division, J3 (Operations), The Joint Staff, Colonel Roger Pezzelle’s book, 
“Military Capabilities and Special Operations in the 1980s.”  Luttwak states, “When 
bureaucratic and engineering oriented military establishments (conventional force staffs) 
attempt commando operations, it is always ‘unlucky.’  These organizations spend 
precious time establishing feasibility studies and planning committees.  Time that 
established commando units aware of capability and weakness are inherently aware of.”8 
In a scenario such as the one described in the vignette the force of choice would 
most likely be SOF because the President and Secretary of Defense want to have the 
highest probability of success in the execution of this sort of operation and in preventing 
                                                 
6 US Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 17 
December 2003, I-1. 
7 Roger M. Pezzelle. “Military Capabilities and Special Operations in the 1980s.” edited by Frank 
Burnett, B. Hugh Tovar, Richard Shultz. Special Operations in the US Strategy. National Defense 
University Press, 1984, 148. 
8 Edward N. Luttwak. Discussion of “Military Capabilities and Special Operations in the 1980s” by 
Roger Pezelle, edited by Frank Burnett, B. Hugh Trevor, and Richard Shultz. Special Operations in US 
Strategy. National Defense University Press, 1984, 155. 
6 
the terrorists from being able to be successful in their mission to kill Americans.  The 
National Security Council and the President, after declaring the situation an HLD 
situation could choose to have the conventional Navy engage the ship with conventional 
munitions either sinking or disabling the ship.  But what of the hostages and the 
implications of sacrificing hundreds of innocent lives unnecessarily.  SOF’s unique 
ability to conduct surgical strikes, minimizing the chance of collateral damage, are the 
only force of choice for this type of mission. 
C. BACKGROUND 
1. Desert One 
During November 1979, radical Muslims overthrew the moderate government of 
Iran, which had replaced the regime of the Shah in January, 1979.  Shortly after the coup, 
a group of Iranian University students attacked the US Embassy in Tehran, capturing 66 
Americans and holding them hostage in the Embassy.  A few days prior to the takeover 
of the Embassy by the Iranian terrorists, a secret counter-terrorism organization, code 
named Delta Force, had just completed an exercise and was deemed “operationally 
ready”. The US Government immediately identified the unit as a possible solution to the 
hostage situation, if it could not be resolved diplomatically.  In April 1980, five months 
after the hostages had been taken, President Jimmy Carter directed a rescue attempt of the 
US hostages being held by terrorists in the US Embassy in Tehran, Iran.9 
Each component of the operation-ground, air and sea-planned and rehearsed their 
portions separately.  This lack of cross-service coordination was later identified as one of 
the major reasons the operation was unsuccessful.  A key element of the operation was to 
establish a remote landing strip in the desert.  This landing strip was essential to the 
success of the operation because the range of the helicopters used did not allow them to 
fly the entire mission without refueling.  The name of the rendezvous and refueling site 
was Desert One.  The site was critical, not only for the refueling that the helicopters 
required, but because this was where all the components of the operation would assemble 
for the mission.  The organizations established for the mission were a sampling of the US 
Military’s elite forces.  Delta Force, the ground assault element, belonged to the Army.  
                                                 
9 Charles G. Cogan. “Desert One and Its Disorders.” The Journal of Military History 63, issue 1, 
(January 2003), 201. 
7 
The EC-130 aircraft belonged to the Air Force and were responsible for refueling and 
transporting Delta Force.  The Navy provided the helicopters while the marines provided 
the pilots.  The Navy was concerned about the lack experience its pilots had flying long 
distances over land.  To complicate this issue, the helicopters the Marines flew normally 
were an older model than what the Navy would provide.10 
Before the operation could begin, complications leading to the eventual calling off 
of the mission began to mount.  The operation began with two less aircraft than required.  
About 200 miles after launch from the Nimitz, one of the 53s had a hydraulic warning 
indicator light illuminate, and the pilot aborted his mission.  Later, during transit through 
a dust storm, another 53 encountered problems with its navigational system and aborted.  
Six of the eight 53s arrived at Desert One and the window of opportunity for execution 
was closing.  COL Beckwith, the Delta Force Commander, pressed to continue the 
mission.  As the Delta Force troops were loading the aircraft, another hydraulic indicator 
warning light illuminated on another 53.  Col Edward Sieffert, USAF, the air component 
commander, deemed the situation too dangerous due to the lack helicopters.  The request 
to call off the mission was made and passed to the President.  The President approved the 
request and evacuation of Desert One began. 
However, the 53s still required refueling prior to departure from Desert One.  As 
one of them was being refueled, its rotor struck an EC-130, which ignited the fuel and 
caused an explosion.  Eight of the would-be rescuers were killed and the helicopter was 
destroyed.  The dead and the helicopters were left behind at Desert One.  Operation 
EAGLE CLAW, or. as it became known in the common vernacular, Desert One, was a 
failure.11 
The problems with interoperability did not begin at Desert One.  An air of 
competiveness between the services had developed over the preceding decade.  The 
parochialism which had developed since the end of the Vietnam War between the 
conventional and unconventional forces had created an atmosphere of mistrust and 
                                                 
10 Charles G. Cogan. “Desert One and Its Disorders.” The Journal of Military History. Lexington: 
January 2003, 201. 
11 Charles G. Cogan. “Desert One and Its Disorders.” The Journal of Military History. Lexington: 
January 2003, 201. 
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misunderstanding of unconventional forces and operations by conventional force officers.  
In addition to this environment in the services, Washington had created a hesitant and 
unsure decision making environment.  Washington was not comfortable with the rescue 
operation and this less than total commitment transferred to the planners and the 
commanders of the operation.12  A command environment which lacked confidence in 
the success of the operation brewed failure and the search for excuses to quit around 
every corner. 
Desert One was a watershed event for the US Military.  The lack of cross service 
coordination had caused a critical failure in the mission.  The mission failure and 
subsequent accident highlighted a major split in the way the military had been planning 
and conducting operations.  There were minimal joint operations being conducted by the 
military, and Desert One demonstrated the problems that the lack of cross-service 
coordination and interoperability can cause.  The failure, especially in the world of 
Special Operations, was the impetus for of the Joint Military requirement and identified 
the need to create a command that would ensure inter service operability and readiness 
for Special Operations. 
2. Holloway Commission 
Following the aborted mission at Desert One and the loss of life, Congress 
directed an investigation into the mission and what caused the failure.  This investigation 
became known as the Holloway Commission, named after the Chairman, Admiral J. L. 
Holloway, III, USN (Ret).  The investigation was called the Special Operations Review 
Group, and they published their findings in Rescue Mission Report and presented the 
report to Congress.  The investigation found that although adequate planning existed, it 
did not include additional helicopters nor account for bad weather in the plan.  The report 
also determined that preparation was adequate but lacked a full mission profile 
rehearsal.13  If the rehearsal had been conducted it is likely the weak links in the chain of 
                                                 
12 Charles G. Cogan. “Desert One and Its Disorders.” The Journal of Military History. Lexington: 
January 2003, 201. 
13 A full mission profile rehearsal is a training exercise in which all the elements that will execute the 
mission, rehearse the entire operation from beginning to end with all the equipment to be used and in the 
environment and setting in which the mission will be executed.  This type of rehearsal is normally 
completed immediately prior to mission execution and allows all the forces to “iron out” the last minute 
details of the operation prior to its execution. 
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command would have been identified.  The report specifically states that command and 
control above the Joint Task Force (JTF) or the “upper echelons” was excellent.  
However, at the JTF and below, the chain of command was not as clear and became 
especially muddled on the issue of who was really in charge.  The relationships were 
tenuous and were easily influenced, creating misunderstanding about who could make the 
mission decision to continue or abort the mission.  The conclusion of the report led to the 
commission’s recommendation that a “Counter-Terrorism Joint Task Force (CTJTF) be 
established as a field agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with permanently assigned 
personnel and certain assigned forces.”14  The CTJTF became the first permanently 
manned and funded Joint Special Operations Unit. 
One of the first steps toward effecting the change recommended by the Holloway 
Commission was the Defense Guidance of 1981.  This guidance was the first mention of 
SOF as a force, and it directed each of the services to develop a Special Operations 
capability.15  With the mission failure at Desert One and the resulting findings of the 
Holloway Commission, Congress became involved in the development and preparation 
of the military to fight.  This involvement would create significant changes in the US 
Military and the Department of Defense forcing the military to become jointly 
interoperable and increasing the power and oversight of civilian authority over the 
Department of Defense.  Desert One and the findings of the Holloway Commission were 
the impetus for Congress to mandate a change in the way the military fights and trains to 
fight.  This forced change was finally implemented in 1986 with the Goldwater-Nichols 
Act. 
3. Goldwater-Nichols Defense Act 
The intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act 
of 1986 was: 
1) reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian 
authority in the Department; 
                                                 
14 Admiral J. L. Holloway, III, USN (Ret), “Rescue Mission Report.” Statement made by Holloway to 
US Congress in August 1980. 
15 John O. Marsh, Jr. text of speech. “Special Operations in US Strategy.” Edited by Frank Burnett, B. 
Hugh Tovar, Richard Shultz, National Defense University Press, 1984, 18. 
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2) improve the military advice provided to the President, the National 
Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense; 
3) place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and 
specified combatant commanders for the accomplishment of the 
missions assigned to those commands; 
4) ensure that the authority of the commanders of the unified and 
specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with the 
responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of 
missions assigned to their commands; 
5) increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency 
planning; 
6) provide for more efficient use of defense resources; 
7) improve joint officer management policies; and 
8) otherwise enhance the effectiveness of military operations and 
improve the management and administration of the Department of 
Defense.16 
These changes to the Department of Defense forced the US Military to become 
more “joint” or, as some like to call it, more purple.  Each component of the military 
Army, Navy, Marines and Air Force were required to fill positions on The Joint Staff and 
the Staffs of the Geographic Combatant Commanders17 and Specified Command 
Commanders.  These positions were no longer a detriment to an officer’s career.  The 
positions became a requirement for an officer from any service to become a General 
Officer.  The forced integration of personnel on staffs helped to mitigate the parochialism 
between the services by creating a better informed group of officers who understood the 
capabilities and shortcomings of the other services.  This development of knowledge 
helped to create more efficient use of the forces.  Not only did the act change how 
personnel were employed, it forced the military to become more compatible.  Gone 
would be the days of the Navy fighter not being able to talk to the Air Force tanker or an 
Army Division not able to talk to a Marine Battalion.  When buying or improving 
                                                 
16 United States. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. 99th 
Congress, available at http://www.ndu.edu/library/goldnich/99433pt2.pdf accessed June 2004. 
17 These Commanders were referred to as Commanders in Chief (CINC) when the Goldwater-Nichols 
Act was implemented.  
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existing equipment, the military was now required to ensure that this equipment was 
compatible with other services’ equipment.  If the equipment being purchased did not 
meet the compatibility requirements it risked not being funded by Congress. 
Almost immediately after the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Act was 
passed, Senators Nunn and Cohen submitted an amendment to the act in 1987 which 
called for the establishment of a separate specified command for all US SOF.  This 
change to the military would be even more difficult to establish than the Goldwater-
Nichols Act.  Mr. Lunger, in an interview conducted by USSOCOM Historian, John 
Partin stated, “The service chiefs opposed a strong SOF organization because having 
made war a life long study and having fought to get to the top, they were loathe to admit 
that their careers and weapons systems were irrelevant to the real world.”18  This 
command would be responsible for the training and manning of all SOF throughout the 
US Military.  Following 9/11, the command was given the additional responsibility to 
plan and prepare for and when directed conduct, counter-terrorism operations in support 
of the War on Terror.  The law which established USSOCOM states that all SOF in the 
United States, active and reserve, are assigned to USSOCOM unless otherwise directed 
by the Secretary of Defense.19 
4. USSOCOM Organization 
The creation of a separate command for the care, training, and development of 
Special Operations in the US military was a key event for SOF.  In the past, SOF had 
been on its own buried in the services as just another branch.  USSOCOM provides SOF 
a voice at the table that did not exist previously.  As an example of how dire conditions 
had been for SOF throughout its history, Sam Sarkesian, Professor of Political Science, 
Loyola University, points out that during the Korean War, several attempts were made to 
employ SOF with little or no impact on the operations in which they were employed.  
According to one individual, who participated in these efforts, “as the organization grew 
larger and more conventional, the effectiveness of its operations decreased accordingly.”  
Sarkesian also explained that an organization established to conduct low intensity 
                                                 
18 John Partin. USSOCOM, Memorandum for Record, Interviews on the Origins of USSOCOM, 
Washington, DC, 6-14 July 1988 (27 July 1988). 
19 US Department of Defense. “United States Special Operations Command History, 15th 
Anniversary,” 16 April 2002, 5. 
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conflicts (guerilla warfare is a SO mission in this context) cannot be formed ad-hoc 
because of the training, preparation, and operational implementation required to conduct 
this type of operation. 20  In contrast to SO attempted during the Korean War, Pezzelle 
explains that the lessons learned from Military Assistance Command Special Operations 
Group-Vietnam (MACSOG-V) serve as an early example of how SO planning and 
execution should be conducted for future SO Commands.  The tactics, techniques and 
procedures developed and used are an excellent source for how to conduct SO in a 
modern war.  MACSOG-V also serves as an example of problems that can occur with 
lack of coordination and integration of mutually supporting assets.21  Another example of 
how important mission support and focus had become was operation URGENT FURY.  
This operation was conducted to rescue medical students from the island of Grenada in 
the Caribbean.  Analysis of this operation will not be covered in this paper.  However, 
there are some lessons learned that apply to situations that influenced the creation of 
USSOCOM. 
In operation URGENT FURY, SOF were not commanded by SOF for the 
invasion.  During his testimony to Congress, MG (Ret) Richard Scholtes, Commander of 
the JSOTF for Grenada, explained that the conventional commanders’ misuse of SOF 
during the operation was the key reason for the high casualties suffered by SOF during 
this operation.22  According to GEN Brian Brown, on several occasions during URGENT 
FURY, SOF was not properly supported or was misused and improperly employed due to 
a lack of knowledge of how to employ SOF by the conventional JTF commanders.  One 
example he points out that the Rangers were inserted during daylight.  The Rangers 
continuously train to conduct operations at night.  The potential operational advantage 
gained through countless hours of night training was not realized by the conventional JTF 
Commander.  GEN Brown also said the JSOTF with a lack of authority to command and 
                                                 
20 Sam C. Sarkesian. “Organizational Strategy and Low Intensity Conflict.” Special Operations in US 
Strategy, edited by Frank Burnett, B. Hugh Tovar, Richard Shultz. National Defense University Press, 
1984, 265-266. 
21 Roger M. Pezzelle. “Military Capabilities and Special Operations in the 1980s.” Special Operations 
in US Strategy, edited by Frank Burnett, B. Hugh Tovvar, Richard Shultz. National Defense University 
Press, 1984, 141-142. 
22 US Department of Defense. “United States Special Operations Command History, 15th 
Anniversary,” 16 April 2002, 5. 
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control SOF during the operation severely hurt SOF employment.  Because of this lack of 
a SOF command and control, the parochialism between the services was manifested in 
battle when the Commander of the US Marine Forces refused to fly the Rangers with 
Marine helicopters during the operation.23 
The creation of a separate four-star command to provide for the funding, training 
and preparedness of SOF has helped to mitigate the problems discussed above.  
USSOCOM has also become an advocate for SOF commanding SOF.  As noted above, 
several operations have either met with failure or higher casualty rates because a clear 
understanding of SO capabilities did not exist in the chain of command responsible for 
the operation.  A common understanding and knowledge of the capabilities, both 
strengths and weaknesses, of SOF is critical to the success of a SO mission.  Simple 
things which are common knowledge throughout the SOF community, such as Rangers 
fighting at night, are not common knowledge throughout the military.  Secretary of the 
Army John O. Marsh stated that emphasis must be placed on “flexibility, on imaginative 
planning, and on decisive execution.  Conventional and Special Operations Commanders 
must both understand the capabilities and limitations of both types of forces.”24  
D. SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSIONS 
SOF, while a highly capable force, have a finite mission set and a select group of 
parameters that must be met in order to employ SOF in these missions.  It is imperative 
for Commanders to understand these missions and differences between SOF and 
conventional forces.  This familiarity of SOF characteristics and capabilities ensures 
missions selected are commensurate with their capabilities.  In executing these missions, 
SOF can gain access to denied areas, rapidly deploy to a crisis area, or be used as a means 
of establishing a diplomatic relationship with foreign governments.  SOF accomplishes 
these missions while executing its core tasks or as a supporting or primary task for the 
assigned mission.  SOF are equipped and organized to conduct nine core tasks: direct 
action,   special   reconnaissance,   foreign   internal   defense,   unconventional   warfare,  
                                                 
23 Harry S. Brown. “The Command and Control of Special Operations Forces.” Naval Post Graduate 
School, Monterey, CA, December 1996, 40, 47. 
24 John O. Marsh. Text of speech, Special Operations in US Strategy. edited by Frank Burnett, B. 
Hugh Tovvar, Richard Shultz National Defense University Press, 1984, 23. 
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counterterrorism, psychological operations (PSYOP), civil affairs (CA) operations, 
counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and information operations 
(IO).25 
A direct action (DA) is a short duration offensive action executed in a hostile, 
denied or politically sensitive environment.  DA requires the employment of specially 
trained forces with the capability to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, or recover assigned 
targets.  A DA mission is differentiated from conventional missions by the level of risk to 
the force and the strategic impact the outcome of the mission may have.  DA missions 
include raids, ambushes, and direct assaults.  These DA specific missions can be 
accomplished using stand-off attacks such as information operations (IO) or via air, 
maritime, or ground-based platforms. 
Special reconnaissance (SR) includes reconnaissance and surveillance missions 
conducted in environments described in DA.  SR is executed to collect and/or verify 
information of strategic or operational importance. 
Foreign internal defense (FID) is conducted to train a host nation’s military 
force to defeat an insurgent threat, lawlessness or subversion.  FID can be conducted 
beginning at the very basic levels of establishing a military from nothing, to conducting 
training in a highly complicated and risky mission such as hostage rescue.  
Unconventional Warfare (UW) involves all aspects of the SO mission set.  UW 
is the umbrella of operations which SOF were originally created to execute.  The UW 
main effort is Guerrilla Warfare.  UW operations are normally conducted over extended 
periods of time in a non-permissive environment in which the political sensitivities of the 
operation have strategic implications.  The political environment of the host nation is 
unfriendly to the US and its interests; however, UW cannot be conducted without the 
support of the indigenous population of the host nation.  This support is critical to the 
success of UW operations, as was demonstrated by SO conducted in Afghanistan during 
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.  SOF deployed, organized, trained and equipped 
indigenous forces to defeat the controlling Taliban government. 
                                                 
25 US Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 17 
December 03, viii. 
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Counterterrorism (CT) operations are offensive in nature and conducted to 
prevent, deter, pre-empt and respond to terrorism.  The role of SOF is to execute these 
missions as a supporting task to DOD’s overall combating terrorism operations.  These 
operations range from intelligence gathering to offensive actions against terrorists or their 
supporting efforts as a pre-emptive action to prevent the terrorists from attacking. 
Counter-proliferation (CP) of WMD describes operations taken to prevent the 
spread of WMD, through seizure, destruction, render safe, capture or recovery of WMD.  
The main effort of CP is to prevent the development of the capability to produce and 
deliver WMD technology by organizations and rogue nations. 
Civil Affairs (CA) operations (CAO) are conducted to provide the host nation 
with the ability to establish and maintain its own infrastructure.  These tasks range from 
establishing the basic needs of the population such as utilities to providing training in 
civil governmental authority.  The key objective of CAO is to maintain control of the 
population by “winning the hearts and minds.” 
Psychological Operations (PSYOP) are conducted to influence the enemy to do 
the will of the United States without firing a shot.  PSYOP can be conducted over a 
variety of media to include actions or mis-actions of a force to convince the enemy of a 
capability or strength and ability that may or may not exist.  This influence is conducted 
to change the behavior of the enemy forces and to gain an advantage for the friendly 
force commander. 
Information Operations (IO) are operations conducted to influence the enemy’s 
will to fight.  These operations include PSYOP, CAO, computer network operations, 
electronic warfare, physical attack, operational security and military deception.  The 
intent of IO is to synchronize all these actions into a single theme that supports the 
commander’s overall objectives.  IO can be described as an economy of force across the 
spectrum of the battle space.26 
                                                 
26 Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 17 December 
2003, II-4 – II-8. 
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E. US NORTHERN COMMAND MISSIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, significant changes were directed in 
US Government to counter and prevent the chances for another terrorist attack.  One of 
the most significant changes the Department of Defense made was the establishment of a 
Combatant Command whose geographic responsibilities include the US. 
USNORTHCOM was established as fully operational capable on 11 September 
2003, with the responsibility to protect and defend the homeland.  USNORTHCOM’s 
mission states that the Command is responsible for preventing, detecting, deterring, and 
defending the homeland from attacks.  USNORTHCOM’s website states: 
The command's mission is homeland defense and civil support, 
specifically: 
Conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression 
aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned 
area of responsibility; and  
As directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, provide military 
assistance to civil authorities including consequence management 
operations. 
U.S. Northern Command plans, organizes, and executes homeland defense 
and civil support missions, but has few permanently assigned forces. The 
command will be assigned forces whenever necessary to execute missions 
as ordered by the President.27 
                                                 
27 Department of Defense. United States Northern Command website, 
http://www.northcom.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=s.who_mission, accessed June 2004. 
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Figure 1.   US Combatant Commands’ Areas of Responsibility 28 
 
The figure above illustrates the geographic responsibility that each of the GCCs 
possesses.  The Unified Command Plan 2002 established USNORTHCOM and 
delineated its area of responsibility.  This directive created the first-ever Combatant 
Command responsibility for the United States.  Prior to this, military assistance to civil 
authorities (MACA) was handled by the Services, primarily the Army.  As illustrated 
above, USNORTHCOM’s AOR encompasses more than the domestic regions of the US.  
USNORTHCOM also has responsibility for Mexico, Canada, portions of the Caribbean, 
and a shared responsibility for Alaska with US Pacific Command.29  The first 
Commander of USNORTHCOM was Air Force General Ralph E. Eberhart. 
                                                 
28 Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3-26, Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security, Final 
Coordination, 26 March 2004, II-2. 
29 “The Creation of the United States Northern Command: Potential Constitutional, Legal, and Policy 
Issues Raised by a Unified Command for the Domestic United States”, 
http://www.constituionproject.org/ls/NorthcomInterim.DOC, accessed, April 2004. 
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As a GCC with all the responsibilities of maintaining regional engagement with 
other nations within the AOR, defending the homeland, and providing assistance to 
federal authorities in time of need, USNORTHCOM has a uniquely expanded mission to 
fulfill. 
To match USNORTHCOM’s unique mission, SOF in support of 
USNORTHCOM is just as unique.  The USNORTHCOM J3 (Operations) Special 
Operations Division (SOD) has identified five primary SO missions that are conducted in 
support of USNORTHCOM’s mission.  They are: direct action, special reconnaissance, 
combating terrorism, counter-proliferation and unconventional warfare.  The current 
mission of the USNORTHCOM J3 SOD is  
USNORTHCOM J32 SOD develops strategies and programs for the 
integration of Joint SOF capabilities; manages and monitors SOF 
operations, in support of USNORTHCOM programs and initiatives.30 
These missions while not all-encompassing of the SOF core missions as 
designated by USSOCOM, cover the primary spectrum required for SO in the 
USNORTHCOM AOR. 
SOF in support of USNORTHCOM is also the lead element for 
USNORTHCOM’s theater security cooperation program.  This program involves 
building relationships between the US Military and that of nations within the 
USNORTHCOM AOR, primarily Mexico and Canada.  These relationships help to foster 
an air of trust and exchange of capability and training.  They also create the ability for 
mutual support in time of crisis.  Areas where this may become a necessary exchange 
would be the ability of the Canadian Forces to respond more quickly to a situation in an 
area such as Juneau, AK or the US providing WMD response to either Mexico or 
Canada. 
The importance of the establishment of joint forces and operations, the creation of 
a separate Special Operations Command and USNORTHCOM, and missions of SOF in 
general and specifically in support of USNORTHCOM are key points to understand prior 
to moving to an analysis of command of SOF in the USNORTHCOM AOR.  The 
                                                 
30 Department of Defense. United States Northern Command, Operations Directorate, Special 
Operations Division mission briefing, 8 June 2004, 3. 
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command and control of SOF conducting operations in the USNORTHCOM AOR 
remains an unanswered question.  European, Pacific, Central, and Southern Command all 
maintain an organic TSOC assigned to the command through the Unified Command Plan 
(UCP).  These TSOCs provide the Commander with a SOF-capable command and 
control element.  TSOCs maintain the ability to rapidly deploy and establish a JSOTF to 
conduct SO in support the Geographic Combatant Commander.  Even Joint Forces 
Command, whose mission is joint experimentation and training, maintains a Special 
Operations Command. 
F. THESIS CONSTRUCT 
Before moving further into the analysis of the problem, some assumptions have to 
be made in order to scale and scope the problem.  This paper will not debate the value of 
SOF commanding SOF, which has been established in Joint Publication doctrine.  This 
will, however, be a determining factor when comparing courses of action for the 
conclusion.  Also, DOD recently analyzed the value of combining USNORTHCOM with 
USSOUTHCOM possibly creating America’s Command (AMERICOM).  The outcome 
of this analysis and any decisions made by the Secretary of Defense to merge or not 
merge the two commands do not affect the analysis.  However, any changes that are 
made will be discussed for further analysis as part of the conclusion.  Another key factor 
is USSOCOM is presently developing plans to establish deployable JTFs as part of 
USSOCOM to support the War on Terror.  These JTFs will be discussed further during 
course of action analysis.  Equipment availability and costs for any of the courses action 
will not be considered.  The assumption is that equipment is always available with the 
organization’s priority and budget.  Personnel to man the organization will be considered. 
That the Commander, USNORTHCOM requires the capability to command and 
control SO is not disputed.  What will be analyzed further in this paper is the frequency 
that a SO command would be utilized, and when such a command is required, what is the 
best means to provide the Commander with the neccessary capability.  A key finding will 
be whether an organic TSOC would provide the Commander, USNORTHCOM with the 
most effective means of executing Special Operations within the USNORTHCOM area 
of responsibility (AOR).  Further research and analysis will explore three courses of 
action to address C2 of SOF in the USNORTHCOM AOR:  
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1) Continue to use the USNORTHCOM adaptive joint headquarters as the 
primary means of providing command and control of SOF in the USNORTHCOM AOR. 
2) Establish an organic TSOC in support of USNORTHCOM. 
3) Apportion a JTF from USSOCOM with habitual association for training and 
operations with USNORTHCOM. 
Analysis of these courses of action will be based on such as: responsiveness of the 
command to a crisis situation; continuity of C2; knowledge of the AOR; knowledge and 
understanding of the unique aspects and sensitivities for military operations conducted in 
the AOR; SOF ability to operate and integrate operations with various agencies; (the 
‘interagency’) and the manpower cost to establish a new organization.  Each of these 
attributes will be defined later in the paper along with a means of quantifying each 
attribute.  If an attribute is difficult to quantify, professional judgment and an objective 
recommended scoring for each course of action will be established.  Thorough analysis of 
the COAs against these attributes will help to illustrate which of the three COAs will 
provide the most feasible and effective C2 structure for USNORTHCOM controlling 
SOF in the AOR. 
Each of the COAs will be defined and evaluated individually against each of the 
defined attributes.  After each COA is evaluated individually a comparison of the courses 
COAs will be presented with a conclusion on the recommended COA to best fulfill the 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION  
The United States Military has a longstanding tradition of warfare overseas.  Its 
role in domestic operations has been limited, mainly in the area of support for natural 
disasters.  However, with 9/11 and the increased threat of future terrorist activity on US 
soil, there has been a marked increase in the collaboration and coordination between state 
and local law enforcement officials and the Department of Defense (DOD).  DOD’s 
response to the threat to Homeland Security, with the objective of supporting and 
collaborating with state and local agencies, was the establishment of the new combatant 
command, USNORTHCOM.  How the Interagency works together and performs with a 
command and control structure remains to be seen.  However - the key issue is command 
and control (C2).  Nowhere is the issue of command and control more critical than it is 
within Special Operations Forces (SOF) and their C2 relationship with USNORTHCOM.  
SOF are a unique resource for USNORTHCOM, and they can be applied to both deter 
and respond to acts of terrorism.  With the role of “military protection of the United 
States territory, domestic populations, and critical defense infrastructure against external 
threats and aggressions,” SOF are uniquely trained and equipped to respond.  But how 
effective will they be if their C2 is not an established, trained and rehearsed organization 
with the resident expertise to make time-critical decisions?  Lessons learned from the 
failed hostage rescue attempt during President Carter’s administration have left lasting 
concerns over how best to manage a complex C2 structure.  There are conflicting 
opinions regarding allowing SOF to operate under the current structure of 
USNORTHCOM with a C2 structure that may or may not be conducive to mission 
success.  While USNORTHCOM has now positioned itself to fully incorporate the 
unique skills and talents of this community into the command structure, there are still 
some unanswered questions as to how that should be accomplished, given the preferred 
method of a “self contained” command and control, distinct and necessary, for a fully 
functioning Special Operations Force. 
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B. DISCUSSION 
The research for this thesis explored the various SOF C2 arrangements and 
determined the strengths and weaknesses of each and when each would be appropriate.  
In conducting the research, the identification of the attributes required for evaluating 
which SOF C2 structure was a best fit for USNORTHCOM was essential for the 
establishment of the validity and strength of the recommendation.  The attributes selected 
to conduct these analyses and comparisons were derived from discussion with experts in 
the field of US SOF operations and organizations.  Additionally, some of the attributes 
are commonly used in the conduct of the military decision making process when 
comparing courses of action in order to determine which course of action will lead to the 
desired outcome of the commander. 
The methodology of this literature review involved researching academic and 
doctrinal bodies of work obtained primarily from two general sources: 
(1) Doctrinal - SOF-specific periodicals published by the service components of 
USSOCOM and the US Joint Forces Command, which is responsible for the training and 
doctrine of joint forces. 
(2) Academic - SOF specific periodicals written by SOF-qualified personnel and 
members of military academia. 
On the subject of SOF operations and C2 organizations, specifically - the two 
categories were mutually, since the academics is based on the doctrine and vice versa.  
The studies and journal papers are based on doctrine established within military 
academia.  These studies and papers help to present a better understanding of existing 
doctrine, and establish a forum for changes and improvements to the doctrine.  While 
preparing for this thesis, the difference between these two categories did not present itself 
as a significant factor affecting the findings of the research. 
The review of the literature evolved into the following categories: the theory and 
doctrine of Special Operations; the theory and doctrine of Homeland Security; America’s 
historical experience with Special Operations and Homeland Security; the spectrum of 
threats USNORTHCOM can expect to face; and the strategic and political environment in 
which USNORTHCOM operates. 
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1. The Theory and Doctrine of Special Operations 
Several Joint Publications have been developed over the last ten years focusing on 
the training, development and employment of SO in support of joint operations and as 
unilateral SO.  The primary theme of the joint doctrine for Special Operations is twofold: 
SOF should command SOF in both crises and daily operations conducted in support of 
the US national strategic objectives; and SOF are highly specialized units which must be 
employed properly.  The proper employment of SOF drives joint doctrine to the 
conclusion of SOF commanding SOF and the importance of the establishment of a SOF 
chain of command to oversee SO missions.  Joint Publication series “3” covers joint 
operations, which includes SO, ranging from the basics of SOF employment and makeup 
to the tactics, techniques and procedures of SOF core missions, e.g., Foreign Internal 
Defense (FID) and Unconventional Warfare (UW). 
The base document for Joint SO, Joint Publication 3-05, Joint Doctrine for 
Special Operations, establishes the approved doctrinal procedures for Special Operations.  
This publication is the basis for how to employ SOF unilaterally or in support of a larger 
campaign or operation.  JP 3-05 discusses the nine core missions of SOF outlined earlier.  
Command and Control of SOF is discussed in depth.  This section describes the 
organizations that are established in the military to provide C2 of SOF in both peacetime 
and combat operations.  It also covers the basics of a TSOC, its responsibilities, and how 
to employ the TSOC in support of GCC missions.31 
In his thesis, “The Command and Control of Special Operations Forces,” Harry 
Brown, presents some insight into the importance of SOF commanding SOF in 
operations.  He cites examples from Operation URGENT FURY in which the lack of 
understanding of the limitations and capabilities of SOF likely contributed to a higher 
casualty rate for the SOF units in the operation.  Also, the lack of a centralized support 
structure for SOF during the operation limited the capabilities of SOF and contributed to 
SOF units attempting to rely on other forces for support.  Brown’s thesis relates the 
importance of SOF to the ultimate success of a mission.32 
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US Navy Commander Sean Pybus provides further evidence for the unique 
requirements of SOF in the conduct of SO missions in his paper, “National SOF C2: 
NCA-Direct or Via the CINC?”  He states that SOF, because of its narrow mission focus, 
requires a specific type and quality of intelligence that is not normally present in 
conventional force operations.  The focus of his paper is on C2 of National SOF 
conducting SO in support of combating terrorism.  Pybus concludes that the command 
structure for this type of short-duration, crisis operation is dependent on the structure of 
the existing in-theater staff, its experience with the type of operation being conducted and 
familiarity with the capabilities and limitations of National SOF and the time available to 
plan and execute the mission in conjunction with other operations that the existing 
commander has to control.  Pybus’ conclusion is that there is no set standard for when the 
theater command should control National SOF conducting operations and when the 
command should be retained by the Secretary of Defense.  Pybus’ conclusion has some 
validity, however, in that he states it cannot be established that the command and control 
structure for an operation will be figured out when the operation happens.  The structure 
required to support such an operation must already be in existence and trained and 
exercised to a high degree of readiness.  If selection or creation of a command and 
control structure is required every time an operation is considered, the ability for that 
operation to be conducted in a timely manner is severely hampered.33 
The SO joint doctrine established in the Joint Publications stating SOF should 
command SOF is a key component supporting the requirement for USNORTHCOM to 
have a SOF to oversee and command SO conducted in the USNORTHCOM AOR.  The 
specific capabilities of SOF and how they are applied either unilaterally or in support of 
other joint operations helps to describe the importance of a SO command. 
2. The Theory and Doctrine of Homeland Security 
Although the process and broad category of Homeland Security (HLS) has existed 
since the birth of our nation, the focus of HLS as a defined discipline had not been 
discussed until after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001.  The doctrine for military 
support to HLS continues to be developed.  As of this writing, the first joint publication 
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for HLS was still in its final coordination draft and had not been officially released.  This 
publication establishes the doctrine for military operations in support of HLS operations 
and interagency coordination.  This draft publication also presents information and 
guidance on the preparation of plans to support HLS operations.  A key application of the 
publication is the description of missions, legal authorities and interagency 
relationships.34 
On 11 April 2003, the US Army War College convened a Senior [leader] 
Symposium consisting of six retired flag and general officers to discuss the role of the 
Department of Defense, US Northern Command, and the Department of Homeland 
Security in protecting our nation from attacks.  The publication of the symposium’s 
recommendation is contained in a Center for Strategic Leadership article, “DOD, 
NORTHCOM, and the Department of Homeland Security.”  The participants of the 
symposium recommended that USNORTHCOM be encouraged to conduct a Theater 
Engagement Plan to establish a better working relationship with state and local officials.  
Another key conclusion was that Homeland Defense and Homeland Security are not 
departmentally exclusive from each other, and require close coordination between DOD 
(USNORTHCOM) and the Department of Homeland Security.35 
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
commissioned a study by the Defense Science Board on how and what DOD should do to 
support Homeland Security.  The report produced from the study, titled “DOD Roles and 
Missions in Homeland Security, Volume I,” discusses what USNORTHCOM must do to 
accomplish its directed mission. 36 
3. America's Historical Experience with Special Operations and 
Homeland Security 
SOF, in concept, have been a part of the American military support of Homeland 
ers fought in the French and Indian Wars of the 18th Security since Roger’s Rang
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35 Bert B. Tussing and James Kievit. “Collins Center Senior Symposium ‘DOD, NORTHCOM and 
Department of Homeland Security.’” Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College.  April 2003, 
vol. 03-03. 
36 Department of Defense.  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, 
and Logistics, Defense Science Board. “DOD Roles and Mission in Homeland Security Summer Study 
2003 Volume I.” November 2003. 
27 
Century.  This thesis will utilize some historical examples to demonstrate both the proper 
and improper employment of SOF.  This will include references to the Military 
Assistance Command Studies and Observations Group-Vietnam (MACSOG-V).  
MACSOG-V offers a unique look at a command that was not designated a SO command, 
but which, for all practical purposes, was a SO Command.  Another factor that limited the 
applicability of historical research scope was the change of threat from a conventional 
Soviet-style threat to the current asymmetric threat being presented by transnational 
terrorism. 
Special Operations in US Strategy is a compilation of articles addressing the 
employment of SOF in the most effective manner.  This book presents several papers 
discussing the issues of SOF employment, then provides additional feedback on the 
papers from subject matter experts (SMEs).  Several articles are presented in this book 
that provide excellent background and historical information on how SO came to be what 
it is today.  Discussions on organization for Low Intensity Conflict and the capabilities of 
SO during the 1980s provide excellent insight into the history of how the force structure 
that exists today and has the leading role in the War on Terror came into being.37 
The Journal of Military History provided an excellent break down of Operation 
EAGLE CLAW. The article, “Desert One and Its Disorders,” provides insight into how 
the operation was originally planned, and what the political environment was at the time, 
and how that affected the final authorization to execute the mission.  The article also 
points out the major faults in the preparation and execution of the mission that led to the 
eventual scrubbing of the mission and the resulting deaths of the would-be rescuers.38 
War in the Shadows: The Guerilla in History by Robert Asprey provides an 
excellent look at the history of SO from Greek and Roman times, when the Scythians 
attacked Alexander the Great using unconventional and uncharacteristic means, to 
present-day   SO.    The  history  and  case  studies  carry  forward  to  the  counter-drug  
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operations conducted in South America.  Asprey spends a significant portion of the book 
on operations conducted in Vietnam and what went wrong and how it might have been 
corrected.39 
In Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War, Eliot A. Cohen and 
John Gooch conduct an analysis of major military operations from the strategic level 
describing how a single wrong decision leading to compounding wrong decisions can 
create a catastrophic military failure.  Cohen and Gooch focus on four different types of 
failure: failure to learn; failure to adapt; aggregate failure; and catastrophic failure.  For 
each of these areas Cohen and Gooch performed an analysis of battles or operations 
demonstrating their theories.40 
In the book SPEC OPS: Case Studies in Special Warfare: Theory and Practice by 
William McRaven, several case studies are conducted demonstrating the crucial aspect of 
SOF timing in the conduct of SO.  McRaven applies his theory to several case studies 
demonstrating how a SOF unit, normally outnumbered, can achieve “relative  
superiority” over the opposing force.  McRaven’s case studies and analysis do an 
excellent job of portraying how critical timing and coordination is in the conduct of SO 
missions.41 
4. The Spectrum of Threats USNORTHCOM Can Expect to Face 
11 September 2001 opened the eyes of America to a different kind of threat.  For 
over 200 years the United States considered herself safe and protected by two large 
bodies of water and friendly nations to the north and south as buffers.  The threat to 
America that materialized with Al Qaeda requires a different way of thinking and 
preparing defenses against an attack.  This new transnational asymmetric threat requires a 
different approach for Homeland Security and Defense planners. 
In January 2004, the US Customs and Border Patrol published the “Terror 
Organization Reference Guide,” which is designed to act as a handbook for Customs and 
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Border Patrol Officers, enabling the officers to more easily recognize terrorist as they 
attempt to infiltrate the United States.  This guide lists thirty-six foreign terrorist 
organizations (FTO) as designated by the Secretary of State.  In addition to these FTOs 
the guide lists an additional thirty-eight terrorist groups not designated as FTO.  For each 
listing, the guide provides a description, location of operations, strength, and where 
and/or who provides external aid to the organization.42 
The US Army Training and Doctrine Command has published a document titled 
“A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century,” which establishes that 
terrorism is an increasingly common form of modern warfare.  The guide presents this 
argument through historical examples and the application of vignettes to describe how 
terrorists operate.  The aim of this guide is to provide the military commander an 
explanation of the makeup and intentions of terrorists in order to allow the commander to 
better prepare for the possibility of terrorist attacks.43 
In the “Al Qaeda Targeting Guidance-v 1.0,” Thursday, 1 April 2004 the true 
danger of the mindset that is Al Qaeda can be seen. In this translated guidance, one can 
see the true hatred and blame that this organization has for anyone that is not associated 
with their beliefs or impedes their progress. Al Qaeda has but one solution; destroy the 
enemy and anyone associated with them at all costs.44 
The threat which USNORTHCOM deals with today will change little in the near 
future.  The best that USNORTHCOM and the United States can hope to achieve over the 
next 7-10 years is a mitigation of this threat.  The threat will remain as long as 
fundamentalists portray the US as an adversary worthy of destruction.  In order to 
continue the mitigation of this threat to the Homeland, USNORTHCOM must understand 
and be prepared to defeat the capability which the threat poses. 
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5. The Strategic and Political Environment in Which USNORTHCOM 
Operates 
The US Congress passed the Posse Comitatus Act as a measure to focus the Army 
on defending the borders and interior of the US from outside threats and prevent 
involvement in civil law enforcement activities.  A unique aspect of Posse Comitatus is 
that it is not a constitutional law but a statutory act.45  Meaning the act was legislative 
only and not an amendment to the constitution.  USNORTHCOM deals with Posse 
Comitatus on a daily basis.  The USNORTHCOM Staff takes great pains not to overstep 
the bounds and guidelines that the US Government has placed on the military. 
But overly broad application of Posse Comitatus has sometimes undermined 
simple operations; for fear that they violate the Act.  This tendency has increased with the 
creation of USNORTHCOM.  The truth is the only limitation Posse Comitatus places on 
the military is that it prevents the military from acting as a law enforcement agency or 
representative. 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has left little doubt as to who will be in 
charge of a crisis situation occurring within the United States.  Civilian authority will be 
explicit during domestic Crisis Response, with the military serving in a subordinate, 
supporting role.  Exceptions to this rule of civilian-led Crisis Response can occur only 
when the President of the United States declares a National Defense Emergency, or 
invokes the Insurrection Act, declared during periods of civil unrest.  Title 10 US Code, 
Chapter 15-Insurrection Act, Sec 332 states: 
Use of militia and armed forces to enforce Federal authority, 
Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, 
combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the 
United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United 
States in any State or Territory by the ordinary course of judicial 
proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any 
State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to 
enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion.46 
                                                 
45 Craig T. Trebilock. “The Myth of Posse Comitatus.” Joint Center for Lessons Learned Bulletin 5, 
no. 1 (Sep 02), 15. 
46 US Congress. Law Cite 10 US Code, Chapter 15-Insurrection Act Sec 332, available at 
http://www.democracyunbound.com/insurrection.html. accessed June 2004. 
31 
Two manpower studies have been conducted over the past six years on the proper 
make-up and manning of a TSOC, and on the question of the need for USNORTHCOM’s 
SOC requirements.  The first study was commissioned by the US Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM) Director, Force Structure, Resources, Requirements, and 
Strategic Assessments Center in 1998, to determine the proper manning required for a 
TSOC to conduct its mission.47  In this study, all of the existing TSOCs were evaluated to 
determine the proper manning necessary for the conduct of existing, probable, or 
contingency missions, ensuring that consideration was given to geographic peculiarities 
of the separate commands.  The second manpower study, also commissioned by 
USSOCOM, addressed the specific requirements of USNORTHCOM with regard to the 
necessity of establishment of a TSOC.  This study, conducted in Dec 2002, was based on 
the same criteria as the above-mentioned 1998 study. In conducting the study, the team 
used the Special Operations Command, Korea (SOC-K) “zero-based” manpower 
assessment as the model for function identification and the approximation of future 
workloads for SO in USNORTHCOM.  Their findings were that, based on mission 
requirements, USNORTHCOM did not require a TSOC.48 
“The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism” directs that all available 
national power must be used against terrorism and those persons and states that support 
it.  The Strategy describes the terrorist threat that currently confronts the nation and how 
it can be defeated.  The Strategy also establishes that the defeat of terrorism will not 
come as the end of World War II did, with a signed declaration of surrender by a nation 
state.  It will become evident only through the continued efforts of the United States and 
other nations determined to isolate and destroy terrorist organizations and those that 
support them.49 
 
                                                 
47 Department of Defense. United States Special Operations Command Force Development Division, 
Theater Special Operations Command Manpower Study. MacDill AFB, FL: Special Operations Resource 
Requirements, 1998. 
48 Department of Defense. Memorandum For Record, United States Special Operations Command 
Manpower Analysis Trip. MacDill AFB, FL: Special Operations Resource Requirements, December 2002. 
49 United States. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. February 2003. 
32 
There is a strong correlation between mission success and the unity of forces and 
how these forces are structured, especially their C2.  The most common theme of the 
various studies cited is the critical nature of a clear and concise C2 structure as a measure 
of success in C2 and SOF.  
C. METHODOLOGY 
In determining the courses of action to consider for the application of command 
and control of SOF in the USNORTHCOM AOR the research determined that only three 
courses of action were feasible.  These courses of action were: creation of an organic 
Theater Special Operations Command for USNORTHCOM; establish a habitual 
association with a USSOCOM provided Joint Task Force (JTF); or maintain the current 
structure of the USNORTHCOM Battle Staff using the Adaptive Joint Force 
Headquarters construct to accomplish the task of C2 of SOF in the USNORTHCOM 
AOR. 
1. Eliminated Courses of Action 
Other courses of action were considered during the research but eliminated from 
further study. Some of these courses of action were: using the Standing Joint Force 
Headquarters-North (SJFHQ-N) to act as a basis for establishment of a Joint Task Force 
(JTF) to C2 SOF executing missions in the USNORTHCOM AOR; USSOCOM conduct 
of C2 of any SO being conducted in the USNORTHCOM AOR, independent of 
USNORTHCOM; Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH) wearing two hats, 
acts as the SOC for USSOUTHCOM and USNORTHCOM; and The Joint Staff conduct 
of C2 of all SO conducted in the USNORTHCOM AOR. 
The SJFHQ-N course of action was eliminated because the SJFHQ-N is not 
capable of deploying as a unit to establish a JTF.  The SJFHQ-N was established to 
provide Commander, USNORTHCOM with a package of deployable staff officers 
capable of providing near-real-time eyes-on information for the Commander.  Although 
the initial concept of the SJFHQ-N was for this staff directorate to act as a “warm” 
portion of the USNORTHCOM staff able to deploy to establish a C2 element in the event 
of a crisis in reality, this organization does not possess the capability in equipment or 
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personnel to act as a JTF.  The most appropriate application of this directorate is as a 
liaison package to an existing JTF, not as a JTF.50 
The second course of action considered and elimniated in the research was 
USSOCOM acting as the supported commander for the conduct of all SO missions in the 
USNORTHCOM AOR.  This COA would violate one of the principles of war, unity of 
command.  It is also not feasible for USNORTHCOM to expect USSOCOM to provide 
timely input and feedback to Commander, USNORTHCOM on day-to-day peacetime 
engagement missions being conducted by SOF in the USNORTHCOM AOR.  Although 
the Secretary of Defense directed that USSOCOM be the supported commander for 
planning for the War on Terror, this does not mean that USSOCOM can be responsive to 
the daily requirements of the USNORTHCOM Commander’s requirements for SO 
integration in the operations and plans of USNORTHCOM on a daily basis without a 
significant change in the priorities of the Command.  Currently, USSOCOM’s focus is on 
the War on Terror and how to defeat the Al Qaeda threat.51 
In order for SOCSOUTH to act as the SO component commander for 
USNORTHCOM, some significant force structure changes would have to occur along 
with agreements between the two Geographic Combatant Commanders on how the 
employment of the SOC would take place.  This course of action was considered as a 
corollary to the study directed by the Secretary of Defense to consider the feasibility for 
combining USNORTHCOM and USSOUTHCOM into one GCC.  In June 2004, the 
results of this study were briefed to the Secretary of Defense.  The outcome of the study 
stated that although the concept is feasible, the end result did not provide sufficient gains 
to match the costs that would be incurred to create the merged command.  Because of this 
recommendation, SOCSOUTH acting as a SOC for both commands was eliminated for 
this research. 
The Joint Staff conducting C2 of any mission, be it SO or a conventional mission, 
is not feasible.  The Joint Staff was not designed, organized nor equipped to execute 
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command and control of forces conducting operations.  Establishment of The Joint Staff 
capability to command and control operations in the USNORTHCOM AOR, would 
render the existence of USNORTHCOM redundant and unnecessary.  Thus, further 
consideration of this COA was eliminated. 
2. Missions in the USNORTHCOM AOR 
In determining the possible USNORTHCOM SOF mission profiles the research 
considered the current and planned missions in existence which support the 
USNORTHCOM mission such as Joint Combined Exercises, SO peculiar exercises, and 
the current USNORTHCOM Special Operations Division approved mission statement.  
These missions occur regularly, and will continue to grow in frequency and importance 
as USNORTHCOM continues to refine its role in Homeland Defense.  In addition to the 
SOF requirements to fulfill day-to-day needs for SO in the USNORTHCOM AOR, the 
wartime or Homeland Defense support required from SO in support of USNORTHCOM 
is significant.  While most of these missions are classified, the probability for their 
occurrence is what is of significance for this research, and can be represented through 
unclassified research.  In addition to this approach for determining USNORTHCOM SO 
missions, consideration was given to what other GCCs, such as US Central Command, 
US Southern Command, US European Command and US Pacific Command list as 
possible SO missions in their respective AORs.  This comparison was conducted because 
of USNORTHCOM’s relative short history of conducting SO. 
3. Attribute Definitions 
The attributes selected and discussed below were determined through 
coordination and discussion with professionals in the field of SO and Joint Operations.  
Each of these attributes has a quantitative value in its definition.  In order to conduct the 
comparison of the courses of action to each other, the values where converted to a 
quantifiable score.  This score is assigned on a comparative basis, that is, each course of 
action is compared to the others and then rank ordered based on the relative value of that 
attribute. 
a. Responsiveness 
How quickly can the command and control organization respond to a 
crisis event?  What is the reaction time to get from the daily duty site to the USNC 
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Headquarters for further planning and follow-on execution of a mission?  If the daily duty 
site is not co-located with USNORTHCOM Headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base, 
Colorado then how quickly the organization can begin virtual collaboration with the 
USNORTHCOM Staff will be the basis of the attribute.  This is not a measure of how 
long it takes to bring personnel in for crisis planning, as in an alert situation.  The alert 
levels and reaction time requirements can be established no matter what the staff make-
up is.  In responding to an event, the organization must have an understanding of the 
current situation in the USNORTHCOM AOR.  An organization that is not part of the 
day-to-day operations in USNORTHCOM will not be able to react in as timely a manner.  
This means that the organization will require a “ramp up” time in order to become aware 
of the current situation.  Online Dictionary defines responsiveness as “reacting 
quickly.”52 
b. Continuity of C2 
This is the habitual association of the organization’s headquarters and 
commander with the USNORTHCOM Staff and Commander.  The Online Dictionary 
defines continuity as an “uninterrupted connection.”53  This attribute can best be 
described as ensuring the relationship between the command conducting C2 of SOF and 
USNORTHCOM is established, rehearsed, and trained on a regular basis. In order for the 
relationship to be established, the command must conduct training with the 
USNORTHCOM Staff and Commander.  This enables the command conducting C2 of 
SOF to better understand the make-up and interaction of the organizations that exist 
within and support USNORTHCOM.  Along with continuity of the command and control 
structure, unity of command, one of the principles of war, is essential to a military 
operation. 
c. Knowledge of the AOR 
Understanding of the unique aspects of the USNORTHCOM AOR is 
significantly different than in other GCC AORs.  Because USNORTHCOM’s AOR 
encompasses the Continental United States, there are requirements and limitations to the 
actions which USNORTHCOM can perform.  In addition to these aspects in dealing with 
                                                 
52 Online Dictionary. http://www.webster-dictionary.org/default.aspx . accessed September 2004. 
53 Online Dictionary. http://www.webster-dictionary.org/definition/continuity. accessed September 
2004. 
36 
a situation in the United States, the relationships the US Government has with Canada 
and Mexico play a significant part in the conduct of operations in the USNORTHCOM 
AOR.  For an organization to have a good working knowledge of the USNORTHCOM 
AOR it must train to conduct operations in the USNORTHCOM AOR. 
d. Manpower Cost 
Where will the manpower to create the new staff organization come from?  
If there is little to no manpower impact on the existing organizations in the military then 
the course of action will score well in this category.  The military has a finite number of 
personnel available to operate with, and the number of personnel who are authorized to 
occupy joint billets is regulated by US Congress.  When a new organization is created the 
personnel who fill those billets are removed from other existing organizations to avoid 
exceeding the authorized total.  While the reassignment of billets to meet new, higher 
priority requirements is not a bad thing, the benefit of the new organization has to 
outweigh the cost of completing the reapportionment. 
e. SOF Ability to Operate and Integrate with Interagency 
SOF possess a unique skill set that other organizations do not foster nor 
maintain.  SOF train to operate in and with foreign governments and cultures from the 
beginning of their training.  Interacting with different cultures and ways of doing things is 
integrated into SOF training routine from the beginning.  SOF have a certain familiarity 
with the cultural, geographical, political, social, economic, language and environmental 
conditions of the nation or nations that they work with.54  The skill set that SOF 
inherently maintains in this regard can be applied to any situation.  It is not limited to the 
region for which the Special Operator has trained.  Once the Special Operator has the 
understanding of how to fit into one nation’s culture, he can use these skills to quickly 
adjust to an unfamiliar one.  Extending this concept, a Special Operator should be able to 
more quickly integrate with the Interagency.  In addition to easily adjusting to the 
different culture of the Interagency, SOF routinely works with Interagency at all levels.  
This working relationship has been fostered over many years, and continues now in the 
execution of the War on Terror.  An organization that has SOF as its backbone will score 
better with this attribute. 
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4. Conduct of Analysis of Courses of Action 
In conducting the analysis of the COAs, each COA was assessed individually 
against each of the attributes defined above.  The attributes were discussed as they 
applied to each COA.  Both positive and negative aspects of each attribute as it applies to 
a particular COA.  After the separate individual comparison of the COAs, the research 
was developed to support a comparison of each COA to the other.  Each COA was 
compared with the other as it rated in each attribute giving each COA a numerical value. 
In this research the lower the number the better the score.  If the research determined that 
two or more COAs where equal, the score was then divided equally among the COA 
involved in the tie.  The comparison of the COAs to the research determined which COA 
received the best rating as compared to the attributes.  
Finally, the comparative scores of all three COAs, based on the defined attributes, 
determined which course of action best fits the needs and requirements for 
USNORTHCOM’s Command and Control of Special Operations Forces in the Area of 
Responsibility.  The implications of these findings were refined and discussed, with 
additional analysis to look for any shortcomings of the recommended course of action. 
In the conclusion of the thesis, recommended areas of further interest and study 
were discussed.  These are areas originally eliminated from the research as a means of 
managing the scope of the problem, or other which offer opportunities to explore possible 





The establishment of separate Special Operations (SO) Headquarters was not a 
new idea created by the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Act.  As early as World War II, SO 
was recognized as unique and requiring special considerations for mission support and 
control.  As the implementation and use of SO became more prevalent in World War II, 
the need to synchronize SO with conventional operations became more evident to the 
Allied Commanders.  In 1942, the Allied Chiefs of Staff created a combined Special 
Forces Headquarters in Algiers to better integrate and de-conflict SO being conducted in 
the African Theater.55  This headquarters establishment set an early precedent for 
separate command and control structure for SO. 
In 1984, Sam Sarkesian, Professor of Political Science, Loyola University and 
Chairman of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, delivered a 
paper to the seminar on “Organizational Strategy and Low Intensity Conflict.”  In his 
paper Sarkesian stated the strategy of an organization must provide for freedom of 
maneuver in the development of flexible and imaginative ways to execute the mission.  In 
Sarkesian’s argument, it correlates to a command organization whose primary mission is 
to plan, prepare, and execute SO.  This ensures unity of command and coherency of 
operations.56  Because the requirements and missions of SO differ significantly from 
conventional forces and operations, the requirement to have an organization that provides 
this freedom and flexibility for planning and execution of SO missions is key to the 
success of those operations. 
Command and control of forces conducting combat or otherwise hazardous 
operations is foremost in the planning considerations when establishing contingency and 
operations plans.  When a crisis situation arises, the question or debate cannot be who 
will be in charge of the operation.  It is essential in ensuring the highest probability of 
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success for an operation that the C2 for the operation be established, trained and 
rehearsed.  As in all things, the effects of time lost and wasted on the debate and decision 
cycle for who is in charge trickles down and compounds; further affecting the executing 
units’ ability to successfully conduct the operation.  To minimize this affect, the best 
solution is to have an organization pre-designated as the C2 organization for the conduct 
of SO in both crisis and normal operations. 
This pre-designation follows a principle tenet of military operations to “train as 
you fight.”  In creating the best environment for success for an operating unit it is 
imperative that the unit understand and know how it fits into the overall scheme of 
maneuver created by the Commander of the operation or mission.  The C2 organization 
must be established and rehearsed.  Several options exist to ensure the C2 structure meets 
the needs of the commander when a crisis arises, ranging from the C2 organization 
responsible for the conduct of SO being involved in the day-to-day activities of the 
Geographic Combatant Command’s to participation in exercises only, as the SO C2 
element.  The key ingredient for success for this structure is that the training and 
rehearsals take place on a regular basis. 
B. THREATS TO THE HOMELAND 
The threat to the Homeland has changed significantly.  No longer are the friendly 
nations to the North and South a sufficient buffer.  Nor can the vast expanses of the 
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans insulate the United States from the newly developed 
capability of the threats against the US to include the proliferation of nuclear 
technologies and long range missiles from Korea.  In his Report for Congress, “HLS and 
Reserves,” Robert Goldich states that the current terrorism threat must be defined as 
additive or displaced.  Additive means the terrorist threat is unlike anything we have 
faced, and all previous existing threats still remain.  If the threat is displaced then it has 
taken the place of a previous threat, e.g., the Soviet bombers flying over the North Pole.  
Because of this additive ness of a new threat capability, Robert Goldich reasons that a 
new force structure is required  
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to face it.57  This theory brings justification to the need to create not only a new 
command such as USNORTHCOM but an equally new SO command to match this 
newly developed threat capability. 
This new threat capability can be characterized as being full spectrum.  The 
threats range from all out war waged by a nation state to organized crime, such as drug 
smuggling.  It is readily apparent that DOD is responsible for all-out war and that Law 
Enforcement Agencies are responsible for criminal activities.  The area of concern for the 
Homeland is the gray area between these two clearly defined extremes.  This seam 
between DOD and DOJ is where the US is most vulnerable.  Since the US cannot predict 
or determine which nation, nations or non-state adversaries will attack the Homeland, the 
planning effort cannot be against an organization or nation; it must be directed against the 
capability that an adversary that threatens the US might possess or develop.  The middle 
ground between crime and all out war is the subject of much discussion, and drives the 
cooperation between DOD and Law Enforcement Agencies.58 
In the 1990s, the US became one of the favorite and most lucrative targets of 
terrorism after the collapse of the Soviet Union left the US as the only remaining 
superpower.59  Because of the steady increase in the gap of military power between the 
US and other countries, the US, as a target, continues to be a favorite of the terrorists.  US 
Army Training and Doctrine Command’s Guide to Terrorism states that terrorism will 
continue to be the more commonly used form of attack, to counter the US strength in 
military power.60  Terrorism allows any organization or a radical individual to become 
known throughout the world by conducting a single successful attack, by which the 
terrorist hopes to create terror in a populace and to influence that populace to make the 
political or social changes which the terror organization is attempting to achieve.  The 
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Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Strategic Outlook for 2004-2009 predicts that 
terrorist groups as a whole will begin to increase their level of cooperation to defeat their 
common enemies.61  As these organizations become more sophisticated in the application 
of their weapons and use of unconventional weapons, e.g., airliners and trucks as bombs, 
the concern for how to defeat them becomes more of an issue and the application of a 
capability to defeat these organizations is forefront in the planning for their defeat. 
The threat to America continues to increase with evidence that suggests terrorists 
have become more idealistic and extreme in their methods and objectives.  With this 
continued shift toward extremism, the terrorist’s concern for a backlash because of 
heinous attacks on civilians or infrastructure no longer exists.62  This radical extremism 
can be seen in the guidance that was issued by Al Qaeda in early 2004.  The disregard for 
what and how the majority of the world population looks at the methods used by Al 
Qaeda has not deterred their efforts to find new and innovative means of attacking their 
targets, to include WMD. 
The latest version of Al Qaeda targeting guidance directs its followers to select 
primary targets within the following categories: faith, economic, and human.  In the case 
of the human category of targets, the guidance states that the enemy must be made to 
understand there are no limits and no borders, further stating that the land of the infidels 
should be turned into hell.63  This type of directive targeting guidance which strikes not 
only at the national core but at the social well-being of the US cannot be ignored, and 
must be considered in preparing the defense of the Homeland.  In addition to this specific 
guidance from Al Qaeda, the Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept states that 
some possible goals of an enemy attacking the Homeland are: mass American casualties;  
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destruction of property; damage to US economy and agriculture; influence the US 
population to create political change; and any impediment to the movement and 
employment of the US military.64 
Al Qaeda is seen as the principal threat to the US; however, other terror 
organizations and criminal activities may or more likely are conducting supporting 
activities, either in close coordination with Al Qaeda or just taking advantage of the new, 
target rich environment.  The threat to our national borders through the approaches65 
continues even more so now than in the past.  The continued influx of illegal immigrants, 
drugs, and contraband passing across the borders of the US is proof that the threat 
remains to the Homeland from these venues.66 
To counter these threats and the new capabilities that enemies of the US may 
present, USNORTHCOM must develop the capability to defeat these threats.  As was 
discussed earlier the best weapon fit to target terrorism is SO.  SO’s unique skill set and 
ability to operate in adverse or non-permissive environments is a key skill asset available 
to the Commander, USNORTHCOM.  Employment of this capability at the proper time 
and against the proper target, and how those decisions can best be made, is what will be 
discussed in this chapter.  An understanding of the threat is key to understanding the 
importance of Homeland Defense and how to counter the threat, be it eliminating it prior 
to its realization or mitigating the threat once it has materialized within or near the 
Homeland. 
C. MISSIONS 
1. Homeland Security and Homeland Defense 
Understanding these two mission sets and how DOD, more importantly 
USNORTHCOM, conduct them are the key issue to establishing the need to create a 
chain of command and control for SOF conducting operations within the 
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USNORTHCOM AOR.  Neither of these mission sets are new to warfare or to the US 
military.  What has changed is that they are now in the forefront of every American’s 
mind and vernacular.  9/11 changed the way the US looks at the threats that exist in the 
world.  It also demonstrated the capability of these threats to use unconventional means 
to level the playing field between a small band of operators and the strongest military in 
the world. 
In the newly developing military doctrine describing Homeland Security, the 
Homeland is defined as “the physical region that includes the Continental United States 
(CONUS), Alaska, US Territories and possessions, surrounding territorial waters and 
airspace.”67  The military describes two main regions of concern in conducting Homeland 
Security and Defense: Forward Regions and Approaches.  The forward regions are areas 
outside of the Homeland.  The approaches are described as the region “extending from 
the limits of the Homeland to the forward region.”  The approaches are not a constant 
area and vary depending on the route a threat may use in order to conduct an attack on the 
Homeland.68  This does not refer exclusively to the smuggling of illegal aliens across the 
borders.  It also includes flight paths of cruise missile, bombers and intercontinental 
ballistic missiles. 
Simply put, Homeland Security encompasses the efforts put forth to deter an 
enemy attack and preparations conducted to mitigate the consequences of an attack 
should it occur.  The Department of Homeland Security is the Lead Federal Agency 
(LFA) responsible for this mission set.  The USNORTHCOM Battle Staff and Crisis 
Action Planning process describes Homeland Security as “a concerted national effort to 
prevent terrorist attacks within the US; reduce vulnerability to terrorism; and to minimize 
the damage and recovery from attacks that do occur.”69  The National Strategy for 
Homeland Security identifies the following areas of focus for increasing Homeland 
Security and achieving the objectives of the National Strategy: intelligence and warning; 
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border and transportation security; domestic counterterrorism; protecting National critical 
infrastructure and key assets protection; defense against catastrophic threats; international 
cooperation; interoperability; and emergency preparedness and response.70  These areas 
cross all departments of the government and must be coordinated through the Interagency 
to be successful in these areas.  The DOD role in Homeland Security is global in nature, 
creating a defense-in-depth of the Homeland.  The defense-in-depth includes actions 
which deter attacks through certain overwhelming retaliation and pre-emption to 
eliminate the enemy’s capability to conduct an attack.71  These actions are executed in 
the forward regions and approaches in order to prevent attacks from reaching the 
Homeland.  In this aspect of Homeland Security, DOD’s missions have not changed 
significantly in the past seventy years: defeat the enemy before his threatening capability 
can be realized in the Homeland. 
Homeland Defense is the active conduct of defeating a threat that exists, be it in a 
domestic action as designated by the President or in or against a country, nation-state or 
non-state actors.  The DOD is the LFA for these actions.  These actions can range from 
conducting a hostage rescue to launching cruise missiles against a targeted threat.  The 
Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept says the intent of Homeland Defense 
operations is to “ensure the integrity and security of the Homeland by detecting, 
deterring, preventing and defeating external threats and aggression as early and as far 
from the US border as possible.”72  Homeland Defense is what the DOD exists to 
conduct.  For DOD the demarcation between Homeland Defense and Security is not a 
problematic.  The main difference between the two exists in the subset missions of 
providing military assistance to civil authorities under Homeland Security and defending 
against foreign threats to the Homeland.  A simple way to distinguish between Defense 
and Security is to note who the LFA is.  Generally speaking, if DOD is the LFA then the 
operation is normally a Homeland Defense mission.  Within the Office of the Secretary 
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of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense (ASD (HD)) is 
responsible for the supervision of all DOD Homeland Defense missions.73 
2. USNORTHCOM Missions 
In distinguishing the importance of the establishment and mission of 
USNORTHCOM, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated, “We should not have 
the same authorities for Northern Command that we do for other areas of responsibility.  
There is an enormous difference.”74  USNORTHCOM has the same missions as the other 
Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) plus the missions of being the last line of 
defense in defending the Homeland and providing support to civil authorities when 
requested and approved.  Another significant difference that distinguishes 
USNORTHCOM from the other GCCs is that the time to respond to a crisis is 
significantly shortened and the consequences of that crisis are much more significant 
because it is the Homeland.  Typical USNORTHCOM missions range from providing C-
130 aircraft equipped with fire fighting equipment to assist in the fighting of forest fires, 
to conducting maritime intercept operations of suspected terrorist vessels, to Ground 
Based Missile Defense (GMD). 
 
Figure 2.   US Com
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Some other normal operating missions that USNORTHCOM performs are 
Theater Security Cooperation (TSC), vulnerability assessments of DOD facilities, force 
protection of military installations within the AOR, support to National Special Security 
Events (NSSEs), GMD, and counter-drug and counter transnational threat operations via 
Joint Task Force-North (JTF-N).  SO supports each of these mission areas except GMD 
on a daily basis. 
Interagency coordination and interaction are a key element of USNORTHCOM’s 
daily operations.  Due to the nature of the USNORTHCOM AOR close coordination with 
civil agencies is the only way that USNORTHCOM can successfully conduct operations 
in a domestic environment.  Some senior level military officers and civilians suggest that 
USNORTHCOM should approach this cooperation with the Interagency as part of its 
theater engagement plan.  This approach would allow a better focus of the Command to 
incorporate state and local officials in the Homeland Security process.76  SOF has worked 
with the FBI for years in establishing, rehearsing with and training their hostage rescue 
team (HRT).  SOF has also helped the FBI develop this capability and a capability to 
disarm WMD.  In the recent past, SOF have worked with local law enforcement officers, 
training both snipers and special weapons and tactics teams (SWAT) in support of 
counter-drug operations. 
In the conduct of crisis management operations in the USNORTHCOM AOR, SO 
plays a much more significant role.  Some of the related USNORTHCOM missions are: 
engagement of a ballistic missile via GMD; opposing an invading force; support to civil 
authorities in the event of a natural disaster; and counterterrorism operations.  SOF is the 
lead in the USNORTHCOM AOR for the conduct of counterterrorism operations. 
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is a separate combined 
command which has the responsibility of defending the US and Canada from attacks 
from the air.  A layman’s definition of their mission is that they are responsible for 
threats one inch above the surface to the bottom of space.  In other words, NORAD is 
responsible for “air breather” threats that fly.  Currently, there are plans under 
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consideration to expand the responsibilities of NORAD to include Mexican airspace.  
Discussion is also being given to establishing a “NORAD like” defense organization to 
counter the maritime threat to North America within the USNORTHCOM organization 
as a combined command with the Canadians. 
Another distinguishing difference of USNORTHCOM is that there are no forces 
assigned or apportioned to the command.  All other GCCs have forces apportioned or 
assigned to their commands.  The only elements that USNORTHCOM has apportioned to 
it are the commanders of its component commands.  These commanders are “dual hatted” 
in their positions meaning, USNORTHCOM Joint Force Air Component Commander is 
also the 1st Air Force Commander.  In order for USNORTHCOM to receive forces to 
conduct an operation, be it training or combat, USNORTHCOM Commander must 




















































































Figure 3.   USNORTHCOM Organization and Command Relationships77 
                                                 
77 Department of Defense. LTC Ross Brown, USNORTHCOM, “USNORTHCOM Battle Staff and 
Crisis Action Process Brief” (Unclassified) accessed on the USNORTHCOM Classified Homepage, 31 
March 2004, 6. 
48 
This thesis does not advocate a change to the process; however, this process is a 
contributing factor to the reaction time of USNORTHCOM in the conduct of crisis 
management operations. 
Secretary Rumsfeld has described three situations in which he foresees that 
military resources may be requested to support civil authorities domestically: situations 
which require traditional military missions; a crisis or emergency situation which is 
catastrophic in nature; and providing security assistance for NSSEs.  SOF’s role in each 
of these is significant.  In the traditional military missions, SOF will perform in its 
traditional role of direct action, strategic reconnaissance, counterterrorism, etc.  In a crisis 
situation, SOF’s main role will likely be in support of disarming weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) or in a counterterrorism role such as hostage rescue or providing 
technical assistance to the national asset commander.  For NSSEs, SOF provides 
expertise in planning and pre-positioning forces before the event in order to provide a 
shorter reaction time if a crisis does occur at the event site. 
SOF operations in the USNORTHCOM AOR are a significant factor towards the 
success of the command.  A Government Accounting Office report from 1997 stated 
that,\ “SOF is considered an essential element for achieving National Security 
Objectives.”  Another finding was that GCC Commanders consider SOF as their first 
force of choice for both peacetime and combat missions.78  A crisis situation in the 
USNORTHCOM AOR has a greater impact on the US population because it is no longer 
in a foreign land; it is happening here in the Homeland.  SOF support to USNORTHCOM 
missions, be they in support of daily operations or in crisis management, are an integral 
aspect of the success of USNORTHCOM. 
3. USNORTHCOM Special Operations Missions 
As discussed above, SO in the USNORTHCOM AOR can span the full range of 
SO missions, including (but not limited to) direct action, counter-proliferation, special 
reconnaissance, psychological operations, and counterterrorism.  SO in support of 
USNORTHCOM have two focus areas where the skill sets of SOF best support the 
Commander, USNORTHCOM – TSC and counterterrorism.  Although other SOF skills 
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are used, these two mission sets are the mainstay of the SO effort in the USNORTHCOM 
AOR.  TSC is conducted in a normal operations non-crisis situation in support of the War 
on Terror and the Commander’s vision for integrating countries in the USNORTHCOM 
AOR to supporting the USNORTHCOM mission of defending the approaches to the 
Homeland.  Preparation for and the conduct of counterterrorism are continuous 
operations for USNORTHCOM and can be executed at a moment’s notice in a crisis 
situation. 
USNORTHCOM requires near instantaneous conduct of SO in support of crisis 
events and planning.  Because USNORTHCOM is the last line of defense against attacks 
on the Homeland it is imperative that USNORTHCOM have the capability to execute 
operations in a timely fashion.  The only means of successfully achieving this criterion is 
through the conduct of training and rehearsals, forming habitual associations between 
USNORTHCOM and subordinate and apportioned commands.79 
The frequency or likelihood of a crisis event occurring in the USNORTHCOM 
AOR is low, even in this day and age of heightened terrorist threats.  Joint Doctrine for 
Homeland Security states clearly that DOD must be ready to rapidly respond to defend 
against attacks should pre-emptive actions fail.80  Still, the chance of a successful attack 
remains, and what makes this possibility an issue is the damage that it would cause to the 
American well-being and outlook on life, and the perceived, if not actual view that the 
DOD had failed in its mission to protect the Homeland.  Any terrorist event in the 
USNORTHCOM AOR could be deemed catastrophic because it has occurred in or near 
the Homeland, again.  If a terrorist attack occurs in the USNORTHCOM AOR, it is 
occurring in America’s backyard and that is too close for the American population.  An 
attack of this nature would be considered a failure in the US Government’s effort to 
defeat terrorism. 
An additional area where SO focus can support the GCC is through intelligence 
operations.  SOF have been used as “Global Scouts” for years because of their ability to 
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create relationships with foreign militaries and their host governments.81  SOF has been 
used as the lead element for US Forces in US foreign relations for years.  This role of 
Global Scouts gives the SOF a unique capability to gather intelligence and conduct 
surveillance and reconnaissance in order to establish the support network that may be 
required for future operations.82 
The frequency of these TSC and counterterrorism missions varies significantly.  
Of course CT mission frequency cannot be measured or even estimated.  The likelihood 
and probability of a CT mission depends on the information available and the analysts 
who provide the information.  TSC, on the other hand, is an ever-increasing mission.  As 
relationships become more established between USNORTHCOM and countries within its 
AOR these missions will become more commonplace.  Eventually USNORTHCOM’s 
TSC program will be as robust as it is for other GCCs.  This increase in TSC mission 
frequency will drive a proportionally greater need for SO in the USNORTHCOM AOR. 
The most likely employment of counterterrorism SO in a domestic role will be in 
support of the Department of Justice (DOJ).  Not only can SO assist in crisis events by 
providing additional capabilities both technical and tactical, SO can also provide training 
to law enforcement personnel, to enhance their capability to conduct these missions. 83  
Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD 39) established DOJ as the LFA CT domestic 
with the DOD providing technical and tactical support as requested and approved.  The 
FBI, as the LFA for DOJ in CT, has identified four areas in which the agency may 
request military assistance in support of domestic law enforcement when facing a terrorist 
threat, including WMD threats: 
1) Providing technical support and assistance to law enforcement and   
other crisis response personnel; 
2) Interdicting and apprehending those responsible for a terrorist act; 
3) Restoring law and order following an incident; and 
4) Abating the con                                                sequences of a terrorist act.
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The above military support to DOJ is the most likely scenario, in the unlikely 
event that the FBI requires assistance.  The worst-case scenario envisioned is an event 
deemed so dangerous and disruptive by the President that he invokes the Insurrection 
Act.  This Act allows the military to take the lead in law enforcement operations being 
conducted in a domestic scenario.  In this case the DOD becomes the LFA.  The 
probability of this occurring is even smaller than the previous scenario, but once again, 
the consequences of its occurrence or of not being prepared for it would be catastrophic. 
There are three key things to remember when considering SO missions to be 
conducted in the USNORTHCOM AOR.  First, on a daily basis the most probable 
employment of SOF will be in support of TSC.  This will be conducted in a deliberate 
fashion; ensuring ample planning and coordination are completed prior to the execution 
of the mission.  Second, in the unlikely event of a counterterrorism crisis situation, SOF 
must be employed rapidly and decisively in order to ensure the highest probability of 
success.  Finally, even though the likelihood of SOF employment in support of a 
domestic counterterrorism event is minimal, the consequences of not being prepared to 
provide support to DOJ would be catastrophic. 
D. COURSE OF ACTION DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS 
In this section a description of the COAs will be given, followed by an assessment 
of each COA based on selected attributes, and then a comparison of the COA to the 
attributes.  As discussed earlier, each of the below described COAs were derived from 
discussions with experts in the field of SOF employment. 
1. USNORTHCOM Adaptive Joint Force Headquarters 
USNORTHCOM’s Adaptive Joint Force Headquarters (AJFHQ) is an 
organizational change to the standard Napoleonic style “J” staff organization consisting 
of: J1 Personnel, J2 Intelligence, J3 Operations, J4 Logistics, etc.  The AJFHQ concept 
allows the Commander to quickly reconstitute his staff into operational cells, where the 
functional staff work can be integrated to better support current, future and long range 
operations and planning.  This type of task centered organization is an attempt to prevent 
the “stove piping” that can occur in the traditional staff planning process.  This type of 
transformed organization was directed by the SecDef in the Defense Planning Guidance 
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(DPG) for Fiscal Year 2004.85  The AJFHQ for USNORTHCOM consists of groups of 
representatives from each of the USNORTHCOM Staff elements forming functional 
working groups which can be tailored in size to fit the operational and strategic needs of 
the Commander.  Some of the main groups are the Commander’s Executive Board 
(CEB), Current Operations Group (COG), Operations Planning Group (OPG), Joint 
Planning Group (JPG) and Joint Information Superiority Group (JISG).86  The CEB 
consists of the Directors from USNORTHCOM and its task organization varies, based on 
the recommendations from the Chief of Staff and Operations Director to the Commander.  
Each of the other groups has a core element which consists of the basic staff functions 

















































Figure 4.   USNORTHCOM Adaptive Joint Force Headquarters87 
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Additionally, the DPG states that each GCC is to establish a “SJFHQ (Standing 
Joint Force Headquarters) by FY 2005 reflecting standards established by JFCOM (Joint 
Forces Command)…”88  The SJFHQ is a joint C2 element that has permanent manning 
from a cross section of the staff functions within the Command.  It can act as the nucleus 
to create a JTF for execution of C2 at an event.  One of the main purposes of this 
organization is to maintain a staff directorate that is “hot” and ready to command at the 
pre-crisis to contingency operations level.  A key goal in a SJFHQ’s ability to staying hot 
is to maintain situational awareness and understanding.89  This staff directorate allows the 
Commander significant flexibility in how he prepares for and executes a mission.  The 
methodology of the design of the SJFHQ was developed to minimize the setbacks caused 
by “functional stovepipes”.  These stovepipes impede cross-talk and sharing of 
information and knowledge in an organization.  “This standing joint C2 element provides 
unique capabilities for crisis response because of its embedded relationships within the 
GCC Staff, pre-crisis understanding of the focus area of operations and use in place of the 
Collaborative Information Environment.”90 
The SJFHQ maintains its situational awareness through a task organization that 
mirrors that of the AJFHQ.  The SJFHQ task organization’s similarity in nature to the 
AJFHQ begins with the Operations Planning Team (OPT).  This organization parallels 
the COG and OPG of the AJFHQ, and maintains awareness through active participation 
by SJFHQ participating in these Groups.  This allows the SJFHQ to have an operational 
understanding of an event from its onset, thus minimizing the time required for a 
deploying element to understand the operational environment in which it will be working. 
                                                 
88 Department of Defense. US Northern Command, Major Jim Zietlow, USAF. “Standing Joint Force 
Headquarters-North Brief.” (Unclassified) 30 March 2004. Printed from USNORTHCOM Classified 
Homepage, June 2004, 35. 
89 Department of Defense. US Northern Command, Major Jim Zietlow, USAF. “Standing Joint Force 
Headquarters-North Brief.” (Unclassified) 30 March 2004. Printed from USNORTHCOM Classified 
homepage, 36. 
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Techniques and Procedures for Standing Joint Force Headquarters” DRAFT (Unclassified). Printed from 
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Figure 5.   Standing Joint Force Headquarters-North91 
 
The GCC has three basic employment options for the SJFHQ for crisis response: 
1) Employ the SJFHQ Director as the Commander of a JTF and use the 
SJFHQ Staff as the base element to be augmented to fully functional JTF.  The SJFHQ is 
not manned to be a fully functional headquarters on its own. 
2) Use the SJFHQ to augment a component command to create a JTF.  
This integration of the SJFHQ will minimize the transition of the component command 
into a JTF. 
3) The SJFHQ remains integrated into the GCC staff and the crisis is 
handled by the component or sub-unified Commander as designated by the GCC. 
The Commander will select which course of action best supports the national 
objectives and scope of the event for which he is the Supported Commander.92  For pre-
crisis or non-crisis activities the Commander may direct the SJFHQ to act as the lead 
                                                 
91 Department of Defense. “US Northern Command Standing Joint Force Headquarters-North Task 
Organization Slide.” (Unclassified) Printed from USNORTHCOM Classified Homepage, November 2004. 
92 Department of Defense. US Northern Command. “ Standing Operating Procedures and Tactics 
Techniques and Procedures for Standing Joint Force Headquarters” DRAFT (Unclassified). Printed from 
USNORTHCOM Classified Homepage, July 2004, 3-18. 
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planning element for an operation, drawing on the remaining Directorates as the situation 
or requirements dictate.  This flexibility provides the Commander with a unique 
opportunity which previously did not exist.  By maintaining a staff directorate that has an 
understanding of the daily operations and more importantly an understanding of an 
operation from its genesis, the time that is lost in preparing a JTF for an operation is 
mitigated.  The Commander also has the option of using the SJFHQ as the lead 
directorate to coordinate the planning and execution of “discreet, time sensitive crisis 
response missions.”93 
SOF representation in the USNORTHCOM AJFHQ is at two different levels.  
Within the AJFHQ members of the USNORTHCOM Special Operations Division (SOD) 
are integrated into the staff as individuals.  These members perform the functions of the 
SOF expert in those Groups.  Currently, the SOD also maintains members in the JPG and 
OPG.  Their purpose is to ensure that SOF equities are maintained in the planning and 
execution of operations. 
In addition to this individual augmentation in the AJFHQ, the SJFHQ has two 
SOF representatives integrated into the OPT and JPT.  Some of the responsibilities of the 
SOF staff officers on SJFHQ are to act as a single point of contact for all SOF 
interactions with other commands and organizations.  This includes other Theater Special 
Operations Commands (TSOCs) and USSOCOM.  These individuals are also responsible 
to provide expertise on SO capabilities and limitations for the rest of the staff.94 
2. USNORTHCOM Adaptive Joint Force Headquarters Comparison to 
Attributes 
a. Responsiveness 
AJFHQ is, along with the SJFHQ, a very responsive organization.  The 
SJFHQ allows the staff officers to maintain a continuous link to what is going on.  If the 
SJFHQ is used as a base to form a JTF this knowledge of the situation will be inherent to 
the organization as it is formed, minimizing the ramp-up time required to execute a crisis 
                                                 
93 Department of Defense. US Northern Command. “Standard Operating Procedures and Tactics, 
Techniques and Procedures for the Standing Joint Force Headquarters.” DRAFT (Unclassified). Printed 
from USNORTHCOM Classified Homepage, July 2004, 3-18. 
94 Department of Defense. US Northern Command. “Standard Operating Procedures and Tactics, 
Techniques and Procedures for the Standing Joint Force Headquarters.” DRAFT (Unclassified). Printed 
from USNORTHCOM Classified Homepage, July 2004, 3-5. 
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situation.  Even if the SJFHQ is partially deployed to support a JTF, the element that is 
deploying brings with it the knowledge of the situation.  Because the daily J-Staff 
configuration forms the AJFHQ of USNORTHCOM, the knowledge of current affairs 
and issues is maintained as the staff transitions from daily operations to a crisis situation.  
In addition to knowledge of the situation, AJFHQ has an in-depth understanding of the 
unique issues and problems that USNORTHCOM must contend with when conducting 
operations in the AOR. 
However, because the SO expertise is dispersed throughout the AJFHQ, 
the organization’s ability to C2 a SO in the AOR is in question.  As was stated earlier, it 
is imperative for an organization commanding SOF to have an extensive knowledge of 
SO, its strengths and weaknesses.  Also, in following doctrine a SO-capable staff 
organization must be brought in to provide C2 of any SO being conducted in the AOR. 
b. Continuity of C2 
For major operations conducted in the USNORTHCOM AOR, the AJFHQ 
provides the commander the habitual association of a staff that plans and trains together 
on a daily basis.  However, since doctrine states that SO should be commanded by SOF 
this type of organization does not provide for the best task organization of a command to 
ensure the highest probability of success for SO.  There is likely to be little to no habitual 
relationship established with the executing SOF and the AJFHQ.  Since USSOCOM and 
The Joint Staff adhere to the doctrine that SOF commands SOF, an outside organization 
will have to be brought into the equation.  This outside organization will not have a 
habitual understanding of the make-up of the USNORTHCOM AJFHQ and how it should 
interface with the Command. 
c. Knowledge of the AOR 
The AJFHQ, because of its origin in the USNORTHCOM Staff, has 
intimate knowledge of the AOR.  Working daily in the USNORTHCOM AOR brings 
with it the knowledge of the laws and regulations which govern USNORTHCOM 
operations and plans, everything from Posse Comitatus to the needs of local sheriffs and 
firefighters and federal agencies.  This knowledge cannot be gained in a few hours of 
briefings as an outside organization stands up to become a JTF working for the 
USNORTHCOM Commander. 
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d. Manpower Cost 
The AJFHQ formation has little to no impact on manpower as an 
organization unto itself.  However, when an outside organization is brought in or 
established to C2 SO in the AOR there will be a significant impact on manpower 
throughout the services to create it.  This manpower drain from other results from causes 
the construction of an ad hoc organization to execute the mission. 
e SOF Ability to Operate and Integrate with Interagency 
As discussed above, SO staff officers are dispersed throughout the AJFHQ 
organization.  This type of dispersement does not lend itself a quality interaction between 
the SO staff officers and the Interagency.  Because the SO staff officers are not a 
cohesive group within the AJFHQ their skills and abilities cannot be used to the 
command’s advantage in coordinating and integrating with the Interagency.  The limited 
experience and SO know-how that the command possesses becomes diluted with this 
type of organization and is not conducive to successful SO. 
3. Theater Special Operations Command North 
Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) are assigned, in accordance with 
the Unified Command Plan (UCP), sub-unified commands under each GCC except 
USNORTHCOM.  The purpose of the TSOC is to provide the Commander with advice 
on employment of SOF and to have a deployable headquarters which can act as the base 
for a JSOTF or deploy as a JSOTF itself.  TSOCs were established to ensure that the full 
capability of SOF is applied to the operational continuum that the GCCs face on an 
everyday basis.95 
Each TSOC has a slightly different task organization, depending upon its AOR 
and mission requirements as assigned by the GCC the TSOC supports.  The standard 
approach for employment of a TSOC for operations is to form the staff into a JSOTF or a 
JFSOCC.  While this approach is feasible for short duration operations, it becomes 
extremely difficult to maintain for an extended period of time without augmentation from 
outside organizations.96  In addition to being responsible for the formation of a JSOTF, 
                                                 
95 Henry H. Shelton. “Coming of Age: Theater Special Operations Commands.” Joint Force 
Quarterly, Winter, 1996-97, 51. 
96 Department of Defense. “Joint Special Operations Insights, June 2002.” Joint Center for Lessons 
Learned. March 2003, 32. 
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the TSOC Commander acts as a Joint Force Commander, theater SOF advisor and Joint 
Force Special Operations Component Commander.97  The manning of TSOCs consists of 
staff officers and civilians with experience in SO.  As in all staff organizations, some of 
these officers have more SO experience then others.  The advantage the TSOC provides 
the GCC is that the TSOC staff is focused on SO, either unilaterally, or in support of a 
larger campaign or operation. 
 
Figure 6.   Theater-Level Special Operations Forces Command and Control98 
 
Some of the daily missions that TSOCs fulfill in support of the GCC are Theater 
Security Cooperation (TSC) and Integrated Survey Plans (ISPs).  The ISP supports US 
Embassies’ Emergency Action Plans (EAPs) and Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations 
                                                 
97 Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3-05 Joint Doctrine for Special Operations. 17 December 
2003, III-4. 
98 Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. 17 December 
2004, III-3. 
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(NEO) plans.  In support of the GCC’s TSC, the TSOC is responsible for planning and 
conduct of Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET).  JCETs are training activities 
conducted with a host nation’s military or paramilitary force.99  USNORTHCOM is no 
different from other commands in its requirements to accomplish these missions. 
In the event of a crisis situation, the GCC is likely to direct the TSOC to establish 
a JSOTF to C2 the operation.  Because TSOC staffs are intimately familiar with existing 
theater plans through training and exercises and the development of those plans, a TSOC 
staff can move rapidly from a cold start to a crisis response by establishing a JSTOF.  If a 
staff other than the TSOC is used, a significant increase in risk to the operation must be 
accepted.100 
4. Theater Special Operations Command North Comparison to 
Attributes 
a. Responsiveness 
The TSOC provides the GCC an excellent organization which is capable 
of providing C2 for a crisis SO mission.  The creation of a TSOC in support of 
USNORTHCOM would provide the Commander, USNORTHCOM with a highly 
responsive staff organization capable of deploying on short notice and establishing a C2 
structure to command a SO mission anywhere in the USNORTHCOM AOR.  A TSOC is 
established, organized, trained and equipped to react rapidly to operations and establish a 
JSOTF.101  A TSOC assigned to USNORTHCOM would nearly eliminate the issue of 
having to “ramp up” a staff to execute a mission. 
b. Continuity of C2 
Having an assigned or more appropriately, an organic TSOC within 
USNORTHCOM would provide the best system of establishing continuity of C2.  The 
TSOC, because it is a component of USNORTHCOM, would develop habitual relations 
with the USNORTHCOM AJFHQ staff officers through the TSOC daily operations.  The 
                                                 
99 Department of Defense. US Special Operations Command, Theater Special Operations Command 
(TSOC) (Unclassified). Printed from USSOCOM Classified website, March 2004, 2. 
100 Robert Huslander, Sharon Thomas, Andy Willis. “Command and Control of Special Operations 
Forces in a JTF: Is There a Best Method?” Joint Center for Lessons Learned Bulletin, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Sep 
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TSOC would have an understanding of the Commander’s intent from the start of the 
mission.  Joint Publication 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations states one of the 
duties of the TSOC is to “provide a clear and unambiguous chain of command” for SOF 
operating in the AOR.102  This capability allows the TSOC staff, when establishing a 
JSOTF, to move forward in an operation using initiative to stay inside of the enemy’s 
decision cycle.  General Hugh H. Shelton, (Commander, USSOCOM 1996-97) was 
quoted saying, “Finally, standing organizations exist to ensure that the full utility of SOF 
is realized across the continuum of military operations.”  General Shelton was referring to 
the existence of TSOCs as standing organizations supporting GCCs.103 
c. Knowledge of the AOR 
In much the same fashion as the AJFHQ the TSOC would have an in-
depth knowledge of the AOR.  However, there would be a significant difference between 
a USNORTHCOM TSOC and the AJFHQ.  The TSOC’s understanding of the AOR 
would have a SO flavor to it.  By conducting training and exercises in the AOR on a 
recurring basis, the TSOC would be able to maintain a connection to what is happening in 
the AOR.  By conducting exercises and participating in the development of plans for 
USNORTHCOM, the TSOC would have a detailed knowledge of the inner workings of 
the command and the environment in which USNORTHCOM must work.  In a Joint 
Center for Lessons Bulletin, Robert Hulsander describes one of the TSOC’s inherent 
strengths as its “long-term, knowledgeable theater-centric orientation and well-developed 
relationships with allies” in the AOR.104  This knowledge of the AOR, meaning 
everything from working with local law enforcement agencies to understanding the 
political sensitivities of the Mexican Military working with the US Military would help to 
mitigate risk in the conduct of crisis operations. 
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d. Manpower Cost 
The manpower cost of establishing a TSOC is significant.  The number of 
soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines is finite and regulated by Congress.  To create a 
TSOC assigned to USNORTHCOM, the positions would have to be redirected from 
somewhere else in the military.  A unique aspect of creating a TSOC is that the funding 
for the positions would no longer come from Major Force Program (MFP) 10.105  The 
funding for a TSOC would come from MFP 11, which is a separate funding program that 
was established to ensure SO are sufficiently funded and manned.  This means that the 
positions would have to be taken from an existing SO organization such as SOC Joint 
Forces Command (SOCJFCOM). 
e. SOF Ability to Operate and Integrate with Interagency 
A TSOC assigned to USNORTHCOM would provide a unique capability 
to establish relationships with the Interagency.  As was stated earlier, USNORTHCOM 
should approach its relationships with the Interagency, state and local officials in the 
same manner it forms relationships with foreign nations within the AOR.  This approach 
should follow the manner of the TSC Program, which USNORTHCOM pursues with 
Canada and Mexico.106  Following this model, SOF should be used as the lead element to 
establish this relationship with the Interagency. 
SOF has developed a working relationship with various law enforcement 
agencies over the last several years.  In operations in support of counter-drug efforts SOF 
conducted training and observation operations with and in support of the Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA).  Also, in an effort to develop the FBI’s capabilities to react 
to hostage situations SOF acted as the primary training agency for this effort, developing 
Interagency relationships at the tactical level.  What is missing is the interaction at the 
strategic level between USNORTHCOM and the Interagency. 
Because of these efforts, the past history of cooperation, and SOF ability 
to understand its operational environment, the TSOC would afford the Commander, 
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USNORTHCOM with a tremendous asset to conduct coordinated operations, be they 
crisis or daily operations, with the Interagency. 
5. USSOCOM Provided Joint Task Force  
In order to assist USSOCOM in the task of Supported Commander for planning 
and execution of the War on Terror, USSOCOM has established JTFs which are 
deployable and capable of commanding and controlling SO for short duration missions.  
A key consideration by USSOCOM in developing these JTFs was that there would be no 
unprogrammed personnel growth required to establish the JTFs.107  This means that in 
order to fulfill the requirements to establish these JTFs, there would be no personnel 
increases or changes to the Joint Manning Document (JMD) or Table of Distribution 
Allowances (TDA) of the units providing the personnel.  In Congressional Testimony 
General Brown, Commander, USSOCOM stated, “We are standing up a Joint Task Force 
Headquarters which will allow the capability for seamless planning and execution of 
operations that span the spectrum of the conflict.  This new structure will provide 
USSOCOM the flexibility to transition to a JSOTF.”108 
The mission of the USSOCOM JTFs is: 
The USSOCOM JTFs will be trained, organized and equipped to carry out 
sustained SOF specific missions or prosecute special operations in support 
of a campaign objective as directed by the Commander, USSOCOM.109  
Another way of describing the USSOCOM JTF mission is to provide a C2 
structure either to a GCC or reporting directly to the SecDef to conduct SO against a 
specific target or operation for a limited period of time.  The JTFs are currently not being 
considered for long duration campaigns such as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) or 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) but concepts are being discussed for their 
employment in support of short duration SO missions. 
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The task organization of the JTFs will vary depending on the mission.  At a 
minimum the JTF may consist of a liaison package only, which will provide the 
supported commander (GCC or JTF Commander) with SOF expertise to assist in the 
planning and conduct of a SO.  At the other end of the spectrum, the JTF may deploy as a 
fully capable JTF to provide C2 for an operation.  This capability will allow the 
organization to deploy to an Area of Operation (AO) to C2 a specific operation for a short 
duration.110  The JTF can deploy to act as an LNO package to augment a GCC for 
planning and operational considerations.  This same organization can also be task-
organized to support a Theater JTF. 
Another option which requires a significantly larger force is the deployment of the 
organization as a JTF.  This organization is fully capable of providing C2 for a SO in 
support of a higher JTF or the GCC.  A full JTF can also operate independently to 
conduct an isolated SO mission in support of the War on Terror.  The number of 
personnel supporting these types of operations ranges from 10 at the low end to over 200 






























Figure 7.   USSOCOM Deployable Joint Task Force111 
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Currently the JTFs are not regionally aligned or apportioned to the GCCs, nor is 
there intent to arrange the JTFs this way.  This allows the Commander, USSOCOM more 
flexibility in the employment of the JTFs.  Once a JTF is deployed into an operational 
area, its command relationship with the GCC will normally be Combatant Command 
(COCOM).  At a minimum the command relationship between the SOCOM JTF and the 
commanding element, be it a Joint Force Special Operations Component Command  
(JFSOCC), a JSOTF or a JTF will be Tactical Control (TACON).  Currently, the JTF is 
not rapidly deployable because its task organization and capabilities are still being 
developed. 
USSOCOM plans on resourcing these JTFs with three options.  Option one or 
JTF-1 will be established using US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) as 
the base element from which to draw personnel and equipment from.  This organization 
provides the largest source of manpower within USSOCOM.  Option two or JTF-2 will 
draw its base of support from US Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC).  
The third option is JTF-SOCOM which will be formed from the staff of USSOCOM.  
JTFs 1 & 2 are service-specific and would require augmentation from sister service 
organizations to round out the JTFs. 
6. Comparison of USSOCOM Joint Task Force to Attributes 
a. Responsiveness 
Any organization that is created from outside USNORTHCOM’s daily 
operations will be severely hampered in its knowledge of the AOR and its ability to react 
quickly.  Also, because a JTF from USSOCOM would be an “on-call” type of 
organization the time required for the JTF to become fully knowledgeable of the situation 
becomes a significant inhibitor to the JTF’s ability to C2 the SO effectively. 
Although anyone of the three JTFs could feasibly support an SO within 
the USNORTHCOM AOR, the ability to facilitate a collaborative planning environment 
between JTF-3 and USNORTHCOM has already been established in previous exercises, 
using existing hardware systems to communicate between the two Combatant 
Commands. 
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Because of the organization’s lack of knowledge of (or focus on) the 
current situation and in order to better facilitate the interoperability of USSOCOM JTFs 
with USNORTHCOM, this author recommends that JTF-3 establish a habitual 
association with USNORTHCOM.  This habitual association would help to reduce the 
time required for the USSOCOM personnel assigned to the JTF to understand the 
operation and the current situation.  In USNORTHCOM’s current staff organization of a 
J3 SOD, the SOF interface for a crisis situation can be easily established with JTF-3 by 
those two organizations. 
b. Continuity of C2 
With this type of organization there is no continuity of C2 between the 
executing unit, the JTF, and USNORTHCOM.  USSOCOM JTFs are outside 
organizations to USNORTHCOM and thus unfamiliar with the command environment in 
which USNORTHCOM operates.  As stated earlier, USNORTHCOM has no apportioned 
or assigned forces to include SOF.  With this in mind, adding an additional, outside 
organization to a critical operation creates more opportunity for misunderstanding and 
increases the risk to the mission.  SO requires a clear and concise chain of command.  
When an outside organization is brought in to C2 a mission, the probability of success is 
decreased because of the lack of understanding and habitual association bteween the 
command structures.  As discussed above, the opportunity to mitigate this lack of 
continuity can be created through a habitual association of a USSOCOM JTF with 
USNORTHCOM. 
c. Knowledge of the AOR 
The main difference between a TSOC and the USSOCOM JTF is the 
understanding of the AOR that the TSOC develops through its daily operations.  The JTF 
would require a steep learning curve in order to develop an understanding for the AOR in 
which it is operating in and will more than likely never reach the same level as a TSOC 
that operates in that AOR.  In this type of organization the JTF will be severely hampered 
by its lack of understanding of the AOR. 
As USNORTHCOM continues to establish its TSC with Mexico and 
Canada, this knowledge becomes more and more important.  Knowing what capabilities 
the host nations possess and lack enables the USNORTHCOM staff to provide estimates 
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to the Commander on what might be required to support the resolution of a crisis.  If one 
nation has a robust capability to handle a hostage rescue situation but lacks the ability to 
defuse a chemical or nuclear bomb, this knowledge allows the staff to be better prepared 
to support the incident, should it occur. 
d. Manpower Cost 
As stated above, one of the key planning factors of the establishment of 
the USSOCOM JTFs is that there can be no change to the man power and/or duty 
positions of the organizations providing the personnel to establish the JTFs.  An 
organization of this nature would not require any changes to the manning of either 
USSOCOM or USNORTHCOM. 
e. SOF Ability to Operate and Integrate with Interagency 
Because of the type of organization that the USSOCOM JTFs will 
provide, the ability to interact with the Interagency remains a key benefit to this type of 
organization.  However, it is highly unlikely that the JTF will be manned with one 
hundred percent SO personnel.  USSOCOM’s staff organization is similar to other 
combatant commands in that it has a mixture of joint personnel, not necessarily with SO 
background. 
E. SUMMARY 
In the execution of its mission the likelihood of crisis response events occurring is 
unlikely; however, if one of these events were to occur it would be catastrophic.  It is 
imperative that USNORTHCOM be prepared for them.  In conducting SO within the 
USNORTHCCOM AOR, the margin for error is negligible and preventable risk should 
be unacceptable.  By creating a sound understanding of how SO missions will be 
commanded and controlled in the USNORTHCOM AOR, this easily preventable risk to 
hazardous operations will be mitigated. 
The USNORTHCOM AJFHQ COA presents the most easily executable COA for 
the USNORTHCOM to enact, with no changes to the current organizations and a high 
degree of success created by a strong continuity of command and knowledge of the AOR.  
The ability of the AJFHQ to respond to the directions and anticipate the intent of the 
Commander provide this COA with a favorable condition for mitigating the inherent risk 
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of a SO mission.  However, these favorable attributes are overshadowed by the lack of 
SO-trained staff officers to C2 of the SOs. 
The creation of a TSOC would provide Commander, USNORTHCOM with the 
most flexibility for the conduct of SO within his AOR.  The TSOC would provide all the 
advantages that the AJFHQ provides continuity of command, knowledge of the AOR and 
a high degree of responsiveness.  A TSOC would also provide the Commander with an 
organization that would help to establish and lead a close working relationship with the 
Interagency.  However, the creation of a TSOC would require significant reorganization 
of manpower throughout the Joint Forces and Services. 
Utilization of a USSOCOM JTF provides a different means of fulfilling the 
requirement than has been broached before.  This type of organization does not fare well 
in responsiveness, knowledge of the AOR, or continuity of command.  But these 
shortcomings can be mitigated through a change to the current plan for the USSOCOM 
JTFs.  By establishing a habitual association with USNORTHCOM, JTF-3 can mitigate 
or even eliminate these problems. 
In the next chapter a direct comparison of the COAs to each other as they rate 
against each of the attributes will be presented.  This comparison will be conducted in 





This chapter will compare and contrast each course of action (COA) to each the 
others as they rate against the defined attributes.  In conducting this comparison each 
COA will be rank-ordered within that attribute and given a numerical score based on the 
ordering.  The scores will be listed in increasing order, from best to worst compared to 
the attribute value of that COA.  Upon completion of the scoring, the scores for each 
COA will be summed giving each COA a total score for comparison across all the 
attributes.  The summed scores will be compared between each of the COA.  The COA 
with the lowest combined score will be the recommended COA solution. 
As discussed in the Methodology section, the qualitative value of the rating of 
each of the COAs against the attributes is based on research, professional opinion, and 
experience in the field of Special Operations. 
B. ATTRIBUTE COMPARISON 
1. Responsiveness 
Being responsive to a crisis event is a critical aspect of SO in the 
USNORTHCOM AOR.  In order for an organization to be responsive to the 
requirements, intent, and needs of the Commander, this C2 structure must have a basic 
understanding of the events surrounding the crisis.  If the organization is not involved in 
the preliminary work-up to the crisis event, then that organization is beginning the 
operation from a cold start. 
Since USNORTHCOM’s Adaptive Joint Force Headquarters (AJFHQ) and 
Standing Joint Force Headquarters-North (SJFHQ-N) are an integral part of the staff, 
their ability to respond to crisis situations is extremely high.  The SJFHQ-N provides the 
Commander with the flexibility to execute actions rapidly and to establish a JTF to 
control the operation in a short amount of time.  However, the lack SOF personnel and 
experience in the SJFHQ-N does not support a robust SOF planning or commanding 
role.112 
                                                 
112 Currently, the Joint Manning Document for the SJFHQ-N has two Government Service-13 (GS-
13) SO personnel assigned. 
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A USNORTHCOM TSOC would provide the Commander with a force designed 
to deploy and react rapidly to situations throughout the AOR.  A TSOC is generally 
organized, trained, and equipped to deploy with or without augmentation to establish a 
Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF).  This element is extremely capable of 
conducting and controlling the execution of SO. 
Still, because a TSOC would be a sub-unified command under USNORTHCOM, 
some of the inherent knowledge of an operation’s preliminary stages may be lost.  A 
TSOC tends to have some separation from the Geographic Combatant Commander’s 
staff.  This separation is not serious, nor does it degrade mission execution.  It does, 
however, provide a distinguishing difference between the responsiveness of the AJFHQ 
and a TSOC.  Even though the TSOC Commander is the GCC’s senior SOF advisor, a 
perception can easily develop between the two staffs that one does not need the other.  
This separation factor can be reduced but not eliminated. In his paper on Command and 
Control of National SOF, Navy Captain Sean Pybus stated that a “come as you are” event 
does not allow for any time to address issues of training and experience, meaning that in 
a crisis event there is no time to prepare for it.113  You must come to the fight as you are 
and execute with what you have. 
US Joint Doctrine states that SOF should command SOF with a clear and concise 
chain of command.  In the case of a TSOC, that chain of command may not be as 
responsive.  But the disadvantages of this slower responsiveness do not outweigh the 
need for SOF to be part of the chain of command while conducting SO. 
A USSOCOM provided JTF would provide the least responsiveness of the three 
COAs.  Because a USSOCOM JTF is not apportioned nor habitually associated with 
USNORTHCOM, this type of C2 organization would require a significant amount of 
time to understand before beginning to execute the mission.  As stated earlier, this can be 
mitigated by establishing a habitual association between USSOCOM JTF-3 and 
USNORTHCOM Staff using the Special Operations Division (SOD) and the SJFHQ as 
the base.  Even with a training plan and habitual association, a USSOCOM JTF would 
                                                 
113 Sean A. Pybus. “National Special Operations Forces Command and Control: National Command 
Authority-Direct or via the CINC?” US Naval War College, Rhode Island, 18 May 1998, 11. 
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not be able to maintain the close relationship and understanding that the AJFHQ or a 
USNORTHCOM TSOC would have with the Commander and his staff. 




3. Continuity of C2 
A USNORTHCOM TSOC would provide the best solution to ensure that the 
continuity of command and control is maintained for SO in the USNORTHCOM AOR.  
A TSOC’s ability to establish a JSOTF at its home base or forward would be a 
tremendous asset for the Commander, USNORTHCOM.  The TSOC staff is not only a 
daily operational staff; it is also the staff of a deployable JSOTF located within the 
Command.  This re-tasking of the personnel who on a daily basis monitor the situation, 
plan for contingencies, and deal with the SO units which will most likely be conducting 
the operation, provides the Commander a smooth and concise chain of command for the 
conduct of SO.  The Joint Publication on Special Operations states that “Normally, C2 of 
SOF should be executed within the SOF chain of command.”114  Not only is it likely that 
the relationship with the SOF executing the mission would already be established through 
routine contact on day to day operations, use of a TSOC in the role of a JSOTF fulfills 
Joint Doctrine direction of SOF commanding SOF and the use of a TSOC as a JSOTF. 
The AJFHQ provides a simple chain of command for the conduct of C2 in the 
USNORTHCOM AOR because it runs straight to the Commander from whatever task-
organized, size and mission material in a particular situation.  While the AJFHQ 
maintains continuity within the USNORTHCOM battle staff organization, it lacks the 
relationships that would be established by the establishment and use of a TSOC.  Little or 
no relationship would likely exist between the AJFHQ and the executing SO units.  The 
AJFHQ’s simplicity of organization would help to mitigate this lack of knowledge and 
relationship but could not eliminate it.  Also, the AJFHQ would be concerned about 
consequence management (CM) requirements developing in the AOR more than SO, 
                                                 
114 Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special Operations. 17 
December 2003, III-3. 
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generally leaving SO missions to a lower priority.  CM as a whole is a much larger 
mission for USNORTHCOM and encompasses the majority of the AJFHQ’s time and 
focus. 
As discussed before, establishing an outside organization to provide C2 for a SO 
mission is a decision that accepts a significant increase in risk due to the organization’s 
lack of knowledge of the situation and Command tendencies and personalities.  A 
USSOCOM JTF would be that type of organization.  The recommendations of habitual 
association or apportionment would minimize but not eliminate this risk. 




5. Knowledge of the AOR 
A USNORTHCOM TSOC would provide the Commander with the best element 
to understand the AOR.  The TSOC is responsible for the conduct of the Command’s 
Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) plan.  Ownership and supervision of this plan 
provides the TSOC with unique insight into all the aspects of the Command’s AOR.  By 
commanding operations, both crisis and normal, on a recurring basis throughout the 
AOR, the TSOC will inherently develops relationships with those foreign nations in the 
AOR.  These relationships help to establish the TSOC’s in-depth knowledge of the AOR.  
Additionally, a TSOC is composed mostly of SO experienced personnel who have the 
skills and understanding of the importance of developing these relationships.  Not only 
would a TSOC have a better understanding of foreign nations’ customs and laws, it 
would have a better understanding of the requirements and restrictions which the military 
has to deal with in the conduct of military operations for domestic support.  The 
differences between AJFHQ and a TSOC are minimal.  The separation once again relates 
in the need to have SOF involved in the C2 of SO missions in the AOR, to include 
domestic crisis operations.  While the requirements and restrictions on military 
employment in a domestic crisis event remain the same for a SO or conventional mission, 
there are subtle differences. 
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The USNORTHCOM AJFHQ maintains a high knowledge of the AOR, too.  
Because of the daily requirements to work in the AOR and the dealings with the various 
agencies and organizations, the AJFHQ has developed an understanding of the AOR and 
its uniqueness.  However, the AJFHQ lacks the SO understanding required for 
conducting SO within the AOR.  Although employment of US Forces in the AOR is the 
same in principle, the fact that SOF is being employed in the USNORTHCOM AOR is an 
extremely sensitive subject.  The lack of knowledge and understanding of this criticality 
increases the risk that inherent in the operation. 
A JTF established from USSOCOM will have little or no experience with 
operations in the USNORTHCOM AOR.  This organization must be prepared to conduct 
operations throughout the world, and will not be able to focus efforts in any particular 
AOR. 




7. Manpower Cost 
The requirement for additional manning in order to create a TSOC makes 
USNORTHCOM TSOC an unfavorable option against this attribute.  Since the military is 
limited in the number of personnel available and the number of joint positions is 
regulated by Congress, creating positions for a USNORTHCOM TSOC is difficult.  
Creating an additional sub-unified command for command of SO would require 
personnel to be moved from other commands to fulfill the requirements of the TSOC.  
Even if additional joint positions were approved by Congress, generating the Special 
Operators to fill those positions would not happen overnight.  Also, the priority of effort 
and support for USSOCOM is the War on Terror with the main effort taking place in the 
Middle East and led by USCENTCOM.  The probability of USSOCOM redirecting 
forces to something other than the War on Terror is unlikely.  The manpower survey 
commissioned by USSOCOM to determine the SO needs and requirements of 
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USNORTHCOM emphasized this point by stating in its plan to conduct the survey that 
there must a “zero-based” manpower assessment.115 
Because of the task organization of the remaining two COAs, each would have 
little or no effect on current manning.  Both the USNORTHCOM AJFHQ COA and 
USSOCOM JTF COA use existing personnel within the staffs to create the C2 
organizations.  The personnel fulfilling the duties will be dual-hatted to support the C2 
organizational requirements, eliminating the need to create additional positions. 




9. SOF Ability to Operate and Integrate with Interagency 
The USNORTHCOM TSOC would provide the Commander with the best 
organization to integrate operations with the Interagency because a TSOC is comprised 
mainly of SO personnel.  This provides the most experience and expertise in the area of 
conducting combined operations with the Interagency.  Generally the JMD of a TSOC is 
filled with SO personnel in the operations and planning areas.  Also, the personnel 
assigned to the intelligence, personnel and logistics directorates of the TSOC have 
typically served at some level of SOF prior to their assignment to the TSOC.  When DOD 
refers to its role in defense of the Homeland, defense of the borders is its priority.  In the 
execution of this mission DOD must work closely with the Interagency.116 
A USSOCOM JTF provides the commander with the next best opportunity to use 
SO personnel to assist in this integration.  However, USSOCOM is similar to other 
unified combatant commands in the assignment of personnel.  USSOCOM tends to have 
a significant number of personnel assigned; however, they are not all SO, nor do they 
necessarily have SO experience.  A JTF from USSOCOM could potentially have only a 
an the current USNORTHCOM AJFHQ. few more personnel with SO th
                                                 
115 Department of Defense. United States Special Operations Command, Memorandum for Record, 
“US Northern Command Manpower Analysis Trip, 1-6 December 2002.”  Tampa, Florida, 9 December 
2002, 1. 
116 Department of Defense., “Homeland Security and Special Operations: Sorting Out Procedures, 
Capabilities, and Operational Issues.” Joint Center for Lessons Learned Bulletin. March 2003, 22. 
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The USNORTHCOM AJFHQ has the fewest SO personnel assigned.  The 
personnel provided by the SOD are limited and dispersed throughout the Command’s 
AJFHQ.  This dispersal causes degradation to the ability of the SO personnel to provide 
the Commander with the influential capability of SO personnel with the Interagency. 




C. COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON MATRIX 
The below matrix provides a tabular representation of the COA comparisons to 





RESPONSIVENESS 1 2 3 
CONTINUITY OF 
C2 2 1 3 
KNOWLEDGE OF 
AOR 2 1 3 
MANPOWER 
COSTS 1.5 3 1.5 




3 1 2 
TOTAL 9.5 8 12.5 
Table 1. Course of Action Comparison Matrix 
 
D. SUMMARY 
The analysis and comparison of the COAs shows that the creation of a TSOC to 
support USNORTHCOM SO is the best solution.  The analysis conducted of each of the 
COAs and to each other with respect to the selected attributes shows that the TSOC 
provides the Commander with the advantage of mitigating risk in the conduct of SO in 
the AOR.  This chapter has completed the analysis and comparison of possible solutions 
to USNORTHCOM’s ability to conduct Command and Control of Special Operations in 















This chapter will provide answers to the research question and discuss the 
recommendation to Commander, USNORTHCOM for the establishment of a Theater 
Special Operations Command and its application.  A discussion of the applications and 
implications of this recommendation on the War on Terror (WOT) will help to move the 
recommendation from academia to reality as the military serves its role in Homeland 
Defense.  Modifications to COAs will be discussed in order to present additional options 
to the problem which were not discussed during the research and analysis conducted.  
Finally, a discussion of any further studies or analysis that may need to be considered in 
this area will be presented, followed by a conclusion. 
The Holloway Commission provided the genesis for major changes in the way the 
US Military trains and fights, forcing the integration of forces.  This change, and the 
power shift from the services to the more autonomous GCCs provided the guidance and 
direction for commands of the future.  When the Goldwater-Nichols Act was passed the 
precedence was set.  The responsibility for execution of missions within a geographic 
region belonged to that region’s commander.  The template that has been used in every 
other GCC is to establish and maintain an organic TSOC.  With the unique aspects of the 
USNORTHCOM AOR, the need to have an organic TSOC is even more apparent.  The 
advantage of a SO staff officer’s innate desire to understand the AOR is an asset that 
Commander, USNORTHCOM does not currently possess, but should. 
As presented earlier, JP 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations states that 
Command and Control of SOF should remain in a SOF chain of command under the 
GCC.  This arrangement allows for a clear and concise chain of command affording the 
executing SOF the best opportunity for success.117  This fact should guide the 
Commander, USNORTHCOM to develop the definitive capability to C2 SOF within his 
AOR. 
                                                 
117 Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. 17 
December 2003, viii. 
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B. VIGNETTE CONCLUSION 
Commander, USNORTHCOM designates Commander, SOCNORTH as 
the supported commander for the operation.  SOCNORTH recalls 
personnel and establishes a JSOTF to C2 the operation. 
SO counterterrorism teams assault the ship, killing 17 of 20 terrorists and 
wounding 3.  Once the cruise ship is declared secure, the SOF unit locates 
the nuclear device and begins the disarming procedure. 
The JSOTF monitors the situation and provides Commander, 
USNORTHCOM with constant updates through SO-specific 















































Figure 8.   Vignette C2 Structure for a Maritime Special Operation Mission 
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION REVISITED 
How can USNORTHCOM best command and control Special Operations 
missions in the US Northern Command Area of Responsibility? 
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Based on the analysis and research conducted in this thesis, the best course of 
action considered to answer the question is the creation and organization of a Theater 
Special Operations Command assigned to USNORTHCOM to command and control 
Special Operations in the USNORTHCOM Area of Responsibility.  The Joint Center for 
Lessons Learned Bulletin describes, in an article titled “Joint Special Operations 
Insights,” that creating a JSOTF from other organizations is an “ad-hoc” organization, as 
opposed to the use of a TSOC to create a JSOTF.  This type of organization should be 
avoided because an ad-hoc staff organization has no standards or procedures for 
conducting operations.  The lack of proficiency and cohesion of a staff within itself and 
with the commander becomes a detriment to operations.118  In addition, Title 10 provides 
additional guidance for C2 of SOF.  The provision states that “unless otherwise directed 
by the President or Secretary of Defense, a special operation activity or mission shall be 
conducted under the command of the Unified Combatant Commander in whose 
geographic area the activity or mission is to be conducted.”119  To achieve the most 
efficient and effective means of conducting SO in the USNORTHCOM AOR a TSOC 
should be created to ensure the proper staff organization is available to perform the task. 
The most critical factor for the creation of a TSOC for USNORTHCOM is the 
cost of manpower to create a new organization of this type.  For example, in 1995 the 
figures for qualifying a SO-capable MC-130 aircrew was $536,000 per pilot.  The 
estimated cost of training one Special Forces Officer was $79,000.120  These figures only 
account for the training cost, and not the additional time required to produce a fully 
qualified SO Operator.  The average time for all three services is about one year.  
However, that one year only provides the basic skills required and does not account for 
the experience necessary to become a Special Operator capable of filling staff positions.  
In order to create a TSOC, a significant increase in SO personnel assigned to 
USNORTHCOM would have to occur.  (The number of personnel required to create this 
organization was not researched for this thesis) 
Rear Admiral Joseph Maguire, US Navy, Director, Center for Force Structure, 
Resources and Strategic Assessments, USSOCOM, stated in the conclusion of the 
USSOCOM Manpower Study of USNORTHCOM SO requirements that there was no 
need for a TSOC organization at USNORTHCOM.  He based his recommendation to 
                                                 
118 Department of Defense. “Joint Special Operations Insights, June 2002.” Joint Center for Lessons 
Learned Bulletin. March 2003, 33. 
119 Department of Defense. US Special Operations Command. “Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
Reference, ‘Yellow Book.’” December 2003, 5. 
120 Government Accounting Office. “SOF: Opportunities to Preclude Overuse and Misuse.” Letter 
Report GAO/NSIADS-79-85, 15 May 1997, 4. 
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Commander, USSOCOM on the lack of apportioned SOF on a continuous basis and the 
underdetermined requirement for C2 of SOF in a contingency situation in the 
USNORTHCOM AOR. 
All other aspects of having a TSOC supporting USNORTHCOM indicate an 
obvious advantage.  Continuity of C2, for instance, with a TSOC provides a strong 
command relationship between the GCC and the executing SOF.  The relations that are 
developed through training events, exercises and the shared responsibility for the 
development of SO-related CONPLANs helps to foster this continuity.  Not only are 
TSOCs established in every other GCC, currently US Joint Forces Command has a 
Special Operations Command which has no geographic responsibilities.  Two other key 
attributes supporting the recommendation are Knowledge of the AOR and SOF Ability to 
Operate and Integrate with the Interagency.  These two attributes complement each other 
for a TSOC.  Because the majority of personnel assigned to a TSOC are SO, both these 
attributes reinforce the need for a TSOC.  SO personnel, to include staff officers, are 
more adept at developing an in-depth understanding of their AOR because of their SO 
training.  In the development of this understanding, SO Staff Officers have the tendency 
to develop an understanding and relationship with the Interagency.  Again, SOF fosters a 
strong understanding of how the military can integrate, complement and rely on the 
Interagency in the conduct of SO. 
D. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 
In the conduct of the research for this thesis alternatives or changes to the COAs 
were mentioned briefly in Chapters III and IV.  One of the most influential changes that 
could occur to any of the COAs is to the USSOCOM JTF COA.  This COA scored poorly 
on several of the attributes because of its isolation from USNORTHCOM staff processes 
and procedures.  Mitigation of this separation could occur fairly easily by, at a minimum, 
establishing a habitual relationship between one of the JTFs and USNORTHCOM.  
Ideally, USSOCOM JTF-3 would be apportioned to USNORTHCOM for planning.  This 
apportionment would insure that USNORTHCOM had priority of support from that JTF, 
and prevent the JTF from losing focus on USNORTHCOM operations.  The 
apportionment of the JTF would also help to develop the habitual working relationship 
that is required to ensure a smooth transition from normal operations to contingency or 
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crisis operations.  The Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security states that the Commander, 
USSOCOM is to serve as the supported commander for counterterrorism missions and 
acts as the supporting commander to USNORTHCOM and USPACOM for operations 
requiring SOF.121 
E. FURTHER STUDIES REQUIRED OR RECOMMENDED 
Two subject areas that are sequels of this thesis require further analysis and study.  
First, if USNORTHCOM is to establish a TSOC to execute C2 of SOF in the AOR, then 
what should be the make-up or task organization of the TSOC.  Each TSOC has a 
different task organization based on the missions of that GCC.  Because of this, there is 
no “cookie cutter” approach for the establishment of a TSOC.  In order to ensure that the 
task organization fits the mission, a study must be made of the SO mission requirements 
for USNORTHCOM.  Second, if USSOCOM is going to provide a JTF to C2 SOF for 
USNORTHCOM, what should the relationship be?  What capabilities should that 
organization possess in order to best support Commander, USNORTHCOM’s mission of 
defending the Homeland? 
Because this thesis is unclassified, several SO missions were not discussed in 
detail, or at all.  In order to develop a more accurate picture of the requirements of 
USNORTHCOM to conduct SO, a classified manpower study should be conducted.  The 
SO classified missions are known to the author and their possible impacts were 
considered in the preparation of the thesis; however, they cannot be discussed in this 
forum. 
F. EFFECT ON WAR ON TERROR 
The creation of a TSOC for USNORTHCOM would provide the Commander 
with an organization trained to conduct counterterrorism.  A TSOC would also provide 
the Commander with a staff element able to conduct the specialized planning and 
execution of counterterrorism operations.  This would give the Commander a staff 
organization with close ties to USSOCOM, the DOD lead in the WOT, which would 
ensure the command’s efforts to defeat terrorism remain a priority.  Major Mark Davis, 
USA, explained in his paper, “Operation ANACONDA: Command and Confusion in  
                                                 
121 Department of Defense. Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security (Final Coordinating Draft), 26 
March 2004, II-11-II-12. 
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Joint Warfare,” that the WOT is such a dynamic operational environment that an 
effective, well-organized command structure must exist in order to support successful 
operations.122 
On the other hand, the creation of a TSOC could be perceived as a detriment to 
the WOT.  Moving more SO-trained personnel to support Homeland Defense would take 
them away from the front lines in the WOT.  The main objective of the WOT is to defeat 
the terrorist prior to the threat being truly realized or materialized in the Homeland.  The 
best means of doing this is by defeating the terrorists in their perceived safe-havens, not 
waiting until they are in the act of attacking the Homeland.  In a workshop on Homeland 
Security and Special Operations, attended by senior military personnel, one of the stated 
comments was that “the optimum use of SOF warriors is not at home in CONUS 
(Continental United States), where the American public might have a severe reservation 
about their employment in-country, but overseas, to go after the terrorists where they 
live.”123 
11 September 2001 elevated an issue which the military has always trained for but 
never thought of on such a scale since World War II: rear area security.  Currently, DOD 
provides ongoing support to this through Operation NOBLE EAGLE (ONE).124  But the 
full responsibility to defend the Homeland must be considered and prepared for.  If the 
threat is mainly an asymmetric threat, then the best possible force to counter that threat is 
an organization trained to fight and defeat an asymmetric threat, Special Operations 
Forces.  To fully prepare USNORTHCOM to fight the War on Terror, a TSOC should be 
created to provide Commander, USNORTHCOM this capability. 
G. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has shown the importance of the establishment of an organization to 
Command and Control Special Operation Forces in the US Northern Command Area of 
Responsibility by providing a discussion of the current and future threat to the Homeland 
                                                 
122 Mark G. Davis, MAJ, USA. “Operation ANACONDA: Command and Confusion in Joint 
Warfare.” School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. 
June 2004, 4. 
123 Department of Defense. “Homeland Security and Special Operations: Sorting Out Procedures, 
Capabilities, and Operational Issues.” Joint Center for Lessons Learned, March 2003, 27. 
124 Department of Defense. “Homeland Security and Special Operations: Sorting Out Procedures, 
Capabilities, and Operational Issues.” Joint Center for Lessons Learned, March 2003, 24. 
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and how USNORTHCOM must counter that threat.  The thesis has also presented 
historical evidence of the significance of SOF and the importance of SOF commanding 
SOF.  Currently, the organization USNORTHCOM uses to C2 SOF in the AOR is a mix, 
depending on the operation.  This varying of C2 structures for SOF is not conducive to 
the success of SO, be they operations, such as Theater Security Cooperation, contingency 
or even crisis operations. 
The measuring stick for the recommendation by the 2002 USSOCOM Manpower 
Study was a zero-balance change in force structure and the requirement to have forces 
apportioned for operations, then why does US Joint Forces Command maintain a Special 
Operations Command for training and no forces apportioned to it?  The critical aspect of 
a crisis mission developing in the USNORTHCOM AOR is too important to the safety 
and security of the US population for USNORTHCOM not to be prepared to conduct an 
operation of this nature in its AOR.  As stated before, the likelihood of another attack in 
the US has been reduced but what would be the testimony before Congress if another 
attack occurs and the opportunity to prevent it was missed because of a misunderstanding 
of mission intent between the executing SOF and a staff which did not understand the 
capability of SOF in a mission and could not convey the Commander’s guidance and 
intent to that unit?  What staff organization is going to provide the theater plan of 
execution for the WOT?  Or a crisis event? 
In order to provide SOF the greatest opportunity for success, the Commander, 
USNORTHCOM should request the Secretary of Defense to authorize the establishment 
of a Theater Special Operations Command for USNORTHCOM, Special Operations 
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